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The two essays in my dissertation are broadly related to the behavior and decision-
making of firm managers and directors, and how those variables are associated with 
firm outcomes and firms’ relationship with investors. 
The first essay examines the disagreement within the executive team. The model shows 
the negative effect of disagreement on firm outcomes via executives’ reduced effort and 
the positive effect via decision enhancement. In a novel manner, I identify disagreement 
through information-based insider trades in opposing directions. The outcome I analyze 
is firm investments including capital expenditures, acquisitions, and R&D expenses. I 
uncover negative effects of disagreement on capital expenditures, which is statistically 
and economically significant. Decision enhancing effects are measured as reduction in 
a firm’s tendency to overinvest, but the results are weaker. Disagreement also hurts firm 
valuation especially when firms need quick decisions. Overall, disagreement is found 
to have more harmful than beneficial effects on firms. 
The second essay, coauthored with Orhan Erdem, examines the effect of piety on 
individual investor and corporate decision-making, and on the interactions between the 
two types of agents. We use Turkey as our experimental setting, where piety is likely to 
have an important effect on financial outcomes due to the country’s unique political and 
religious background. We have proprietary individual investor trading data for a random 
sample of 25,000 investors, and importantly, we have a number of strong identifiers for 
 
 
investor piety. One of them is a binary variable that indicates whether investors are 
trading through an Islamic brokerage house. Similarly, we have a few strong variables 
capturing firm piety. One such variable identifies whether firm executives are affiliated 
with a secular or a conservative executive club. Our results indicate that religious 
investors display conservative trading behavior, in particular, they display less 
overconfidence and higher local bias. Results on firms indicate that apparently religious 
firms grow their assets faster and are highly valued but have lower operating 
profitability. We also find that upon events that stir religious sentiment in the country, 
conservative investors increase their holdings of apparently religious firms.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 How Does Executive Disagreement 
Affect Individual and Corporate Decisions? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
I illustrate, both theoretically and empirically, how executive disagreement affects 
individual effort decisions and CEO decision-making, ultimately influencing corporate 
investment decisions. The model shows that disagreement reduces aggregate effort yet 
improves the accuracy of CEO decisions. Disagreement is empirically identified 
through information-driven insider trades within the same firm in opposite directions. I 
test the model by studying corporate investments and acquisitions. The results indicate 
reduced investment following disagreement episodes and support the diminished effort 
channel. Further tests reveal adverse effects of disagreement on firm value when quick 
decision-making is needed. The mostly negative effects of disagreement on investment 
projects suggest that corporate and regulatory efforts to reduce executive disagreement 
can boost corporate investment levels. 
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1. Introduction 
Disagreement is ubiquitous in executive circles: it is observed in both the 
management team and in the boardroom. Despite its abundance, each disagreement 
episode affects the executive team’s decision-making process dramatically and in a 
variety of ways, from executives’ self-seeking tactical behavior to the final decision 
itself. Disagreement among executives can be about preferences, such as the amount of 
risk to be taken in the firm’s growth strategy, or values, such as the extent of layoffs as 
part of a cost cutting strategy. Disagreement can also concern future forecasts for the 
firm’s prospects, business environment, and the broad economic situation. This paper is 
concerned with the latter type. 
The late 2016 disagreement between Jack Dorsey, the CEO of Twitter, and Evan 
Williams, the firm’s ex-CEO and current board member, is a relevant example.1 While 
Jack Dorsey wanted the company to stay independent, Evan Williams wanted to 
consider the sale of the company to potential acquirers, perhaps being worried about 
stagnant user growth. The two executives presumably had different opinions concerning 
the future prospects of Twitter. An interesting question is how such disagreement affects 
individual and corporate decision-making. 
As another example, Durk Jager, a long-serving director at Chiquita Brands 
International resigned from his position in November 2010 citing his loss of confidence 
in the firm’s ability to reverse deteriorating performance2. One could argue that he was 
in disagreement with other directors and officers who chose to stay at the company 
regarding Chiquita’s prospects. Furthermore, in December 2011, an officer and a 
                                                          
1 http://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/05/twitter-ceo-dorsey-faces-company-discord-report.html 
2 https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/01/not-a-happy-split-from-chiquita/ 
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director executed “opportunistic”3, that is, informed insider trades in opposing 
directions. This is corroborating evidence on disagreement since people appear to have 
conflicting viewpoints regarding firm prospects as evidenced through their trades. 
Figure 1 shows Chiquita’s share price. return on assets (ROA), and capital expenditures 
around December 2011. Share prices as well as ROA are gradually declining, where the 
latter becomes negative. Capital expenditures drop significantly right after the 
disagreement episode. Disagreement seems to be associated with changes in firm 
outcomes, and the effect on capital expenditures will be the focus of this paper. 
The purpose of my paper is to develop a simple theoretical model on how 
executive disagreement affects individual effort decisions and CEO decision-making 
and test it on corporate decisions related to investment. I show that disagreement reduces 
aggregate effort yet improves the accuracy of CEO decisions. I test the model 
empirically by studying investment and M&A actions. 
In my model, different levels of optimism among a firm’s executives result in 
differences in how they process information. I show that when the number of pessimists 
is large enough to cause disagreement, aggregate effort will be reduced. Insufficient 
effort will lead to inadequate or unsuccessful implementation of projects. However, on 
the upside, when there is high disagreement, the CEO listens more to the views of other 
executives and incorporates their opinions into her own. This information collection and 
processing helps her attain a better decision. 
What this means, for example, for investment actions is that firms experiencing 
disagreement in their executive team sometimes see contraction in their investment level 
                                                          
3 The term, opportunistic insider trades, is borrowed from Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012) and will 
be explained in detail later in the text. 
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as new projects are not implemented. If disagreement is not debilitating, however, it 
helps bring the level of investment closer to optimal as the CEO incorporates more of 
the information processing in the executive team. 
Empirical tests show support for disagreement’s effect on inadequate 
implementation of projects as measured by reduced investments. For instance, 
disagreement episodes are associated with about a 6 percent reduction for capex. Results 
for other components of investments such as acquisitions and R&D expenses are weaker 
although results seem to depend on the choice of empirical specification. Disagreement 
is associated with reduced investments even when the CEO is powerful or heavy-
handed. CEO power is proxied by measures like dual CEO-chairman position 
(Finkelstein 1992) and CEO compensation and tenure (Bebchuk and Fried 2003; 
Hermalin and Weisbach 1998). Arguably even a powerful CEO cannot prevent 
disagreement from disheartening the executive team. 
Notwithstanding the detrimental effects of disagreement, under certain 
circumstances, it is found to weakly improve firm investments. In particular, it cuts 
down overinvestment for firms that are prone to investing excessively. Similar to 
Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009), I proxy the tendency to overinvest by high cash 
holdings and low leverage. When in disagreement, the executive team is more likely 
conduct nuanced debates and careful thought processes that can curtail an innate 
tendency to make errors in the investment decision. However, for firms that need quick 
decisions, disagreement can delay and impair decision-making even if it does not 
ultimately lead to reduced effort. Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2009) find that firms with high 
growth opportunities choose smaller boards since such boards are more conducive to 
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quicker decisions. In a difference-in-differences specification, I show that firms with 
high growth opportunities, as captured by a high market-to-book ratio, see further 
reduction in their annual stock returns following disagreement episodes. Further, it is 
shown that not only investments but also the number of employees is reduced following 
disagreement episodes. 
There is already work in the literature relating employee disagreement to 
individual and corporate outcomes. The paper closest to mine in the consequences of 
disagreement, Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2009), theoretically show that, while 
disagreement leads to more profitable and objective projects, it results in less 
intrinsically motivated agents. Yet, to the best of my knowledge, my paper is the first 
to empirically confirm a model of executive disagreement on project implementation 
and CEO decision-making. 
There is a large volume of work on executive, or more generally, employee 
disagreement both in the finance and the management literatures. A pioneering work on 
disagreement in the management literature, Pondy (1967), argues that disagreement 
disturbs the equilibrium of an organization, and the way in which the organization deals 
with disequilibrium affects its productivity. He suggests that, when disagreements are 
intense, they can unsettle the balance between the costs and benefits for an individual 
to be part of an organization, and can lead the individual to drop out. Using a survey of 
real work groups and management teams, Jehn (1995) shows that whether conflict is 
beneficial or not depends on its type and the structure of the group experiencing conflict. 
She further demonstrates that as the work becomes less routine, disagreement is more 
likely to yield a favorable outcome. Her work can have implications on corporate 
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investments wherein acquisitions and R&D investments can be thought as being more 
complicated than capex and thus less exposed to the detrimental effects from 
disagreement. Indeed, my results generally show that disagreement has more negative 
effects on the relatively simple capex decision. 
In the theoretical finance literature, Van den Steen (2010) illustrates that shared 
beliefs among employees lead to more delegation, less monitoring, higher satisfaction, 
higher execution effort, and faster coordination, but less experimentation and less 
information collection. As alluded to earlier, Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2009) model 
the disagreement between a decision maker and a laborer, and show the trade-off 
between project profitability and employee motivation. Similar to these two works, in 
my model disagreement has negative consequences on employee motivation and effort. 
Nonetheless, I also test these implications empirically in corporate investment 
decisions. 
On the empirical side, Dewally and Peck (2010) focus on the disagreement 
directors experience with their board or the CEO that is exposed when directors make 
their resignation public. They show that such disagreements are more likely to happen 
in firms with weak boards, that is, boards that are less independent, smaller, and 
dominated by the CEO, and firms with recent declines in operating performance. Using 
individual director voting data from China, Jiang, Wan, and Zhao (2015) reveal that 
director dissension is related to career concerns. Younger and highly reputed directors, 
shown to be more career conscious in the models of Holmstrom (1999) and Diamond 
(1989), are more likely to dissent. In line with motives to dissent, such directors end up 
receiving more outside directorships. Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013) look at the 
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inner workings of boards by using proprietary data on board minutes of a small set of 
government-controlled firms in Israel. They find boards to disagree with the CEO only 
2.5% of the time, however, they still find evidence that boards are active monitors: in a 
considerable number of cases boards took an initiative, such as defining the steps that 
should be taken, or requested an update. My empirical findings also show that 
disagreement happens infrequently, however, when it does, it is associated with declines 
in investment levels. Agrawal and Chen (2017) also find that disagreement frequency 
is correlated with board and executive characteristics as well as firm performance. For 
example, disputes are more likely to occur at firms founded by the CEO or companies 
with shorter CEO tenures, higher independent block holdings, or bigger or less 
independent boards. They further find that firms undergoing dispute exhibit poor 
operating and stock price performance in the years surrounding a dispute episode. 
Unlike the empirical corporate finance literature, which tracks disagreement via 
corporate filings, news stories, or board minutes, I identify disagreement, in a novel 
manner, through insider trades. In a nutshell, my argument is that insider buys signal 
optimism whereas insider sells signal pessimism, so if we find insiders within the same 
firm who place trades in opposite directions, the firm is likely to go through 
disagreement. There is a voluminous literature on insider trading and the earlier papers 
(for instance, Seyhun (1986)) find that insider trades have predictive power for future 
returns. However, insiders can trade for various reasons and many trades are not linked 
to information, such as those associated with liquidity or diversification motives. 
Indeed, the more recent literature is ambivalent about the predictive power of insider 
trades (Lakonishok and Lee 2001). In order to filter out the non-informative trades, I 
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use the methodology in Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012) to filter out the routine 
trades and focus on the informative trades which do have high predictive power. My 
main disagreement variable is discrete: it takes the value of one if there simultaneously 
is a buyer and a seller, zero otherwise. In a robustness check, I use a continuous 
disagreement measure where it indicates the ratio of buyers and sellers in a firm’s 
executive team to the overall size of the team. Inferences remain similar. 
In addition to disagreement among executives, there is a large related literature 
on disagreement among stock investors or analysts which is relevant to our 
understanding of executive disagreement. Miller (1977) illustrates that, in the presence 
of short sale restrictions, when investors have differing opinions about expected returns 
on securities, security prices will reflect the opinion of optimists. Confirming Miller’s 
(1977) argument, Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) empirically show that stocks 
with higher dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts experience lower future returns. 
More dispersion in forecasts implies the presence of overly optimistic analysts as well 
as investors. When such investors have more influence on prices, price correction will 
be more dramatic. Asking why investors disagree in the first place, Harris and Raviv 
(1993) and Kandel and Pearson (1995) argue that many times they disagree not because 
they have access to differential information but because they interpret common 
information differently. Using such a model, Harris and Raviv (1993) explain many of 
the stylized facts between volume and price changes such as the positive correlation 
between volume and absolute price changes. Kandel and Pearson (1995) further explain 
why there is significant volume around earnings announcements even when price 
doesn’t change much. Differences of opinion among investors usually have asset pricing 
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implications while that among executives has implications for corporate finance. 
Nonetheless, both involve tactical behavior among agents and dramatically shift 
equilibrium outcomes. 
I apply Kandel and Pearson’s (1995) insight for modeling investor behavior into 
characterizing executive conduct. Executives disagree not because they have access to 
different information but because they interpret it differently. At an abstract level, 
different degrees of optimism or pessimism drive people’s differential interpretation of 
corporate matters. My setup is a simple static Bayesian model where people don’t 
exactly know others’ optimism levels. However, their inference into others’ level of 
optimism drives their effort decision. The more optimistic they are and their inference 
of others become, the more likely they spend high effort. High levels of effort spent by 
a sufficient number of executives is a precondition for successful project 
implementation. 
Finally, there is also work on the implications of disagreement between firm 
managers and shareholders. A paper that looks at the same outcome variable as mine, 
Thakor and Whited (2011) examine what happens to firm investments when managers 
and shareholders disagree. They find reduction in the face of disagreement: when 
shareholders do not like the projects managers undertake, they cash out and the resulting 
stock price decline will prevent managers from undertaking such projects in the first 
place. Although disagreement has a similar directional effect in my paper, the agents 
undergoing disagreement and the mechanism in which disagreement influences 
corporate investments are completely different. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model in 
detail. Section 3 develops testable hypotheses arising from the model. Section 4 
introduces the data and the empirical procedure. Section 5 presents and interprets 
empirical results. Section 6 conducts robustness checks. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Model 
This paper characterizes disagreement among top managers and directors. For 
the most part, it treats managers, except for the CEO, and directors identically in the 
way each individual’s effort enters into the firm’s production function.  “Executives” 
stands for both managers and directors. 
The model has three time periods. Figure 2 summarizes the progression of events 
in each period. At time zero, each executive encounters a signal, 𝑠~𝑁(0, 𝜎2), about the 
firm’s future prospects. Executives have access to the same reports and forecasts on the 
firm, the firm’s industry, and the overall economy. However, each executive interprets 
the signal differently. Different levels of optimism among executives can drive a wedge 
between how each executive interprets the signal. 
In the literature on investor disagreement, differences in interpretation is usually 
captured by different likelihood functions which investors use to update asset return 
probabilities. In Harris and Raviv’s (1993) model, there are two final payoffs: high and 
low. The authors explicitly characterize the density functions that relate the signal level 
to the two outcomes for each investor type. Kandel and Pearson (1995), on the other 
hand, introduce difference in likelihood functions with a simple error term embedded in 
the signal. Every investor observes the same signal, however, when they extract the 
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future payoff information from the signal, their different interpretation, which is 
captured by a simple error term, leads them to different conclusions. I follow Kandel 
and Pearson (1995) in modeling difference in likelihood functions. Since this is a static 
model, unlike Kandel and Pearson (1995), I do not model the prior beliefs of agents. 
Before making a decision, executives communicate among themselves and 
reach their final interpretation of the signal.4 Let executive 𝑖’s final interpretation be 
denoted as 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖, where 𝜖𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐
2 ). The 𝑖th executive is optimistic if 𝜖𝑖 > 0, 
pessimistic otherwise. The way the CEO interprets the signal is the same except that she 
has higher precision, in particular, 𝜎𝐶𝐸𝑂 < 𝜎𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐. 
At time one, each executive has to decide how much effort to put into the 
implementation of a number of projects that is available to the firm. To keep things 
simple, suppose that executives can put in either high or low effort. Let 𝐶𝐻(𝑠𝑖) and 
𝐶𝐿(𝑠𝑖) denote the cost of exerting each level of effort, respectively, when the executive 
has interpreted the signal as 𝑠𝑖. Putting in high effort is costlier. However, as the 
executive becomes more optimistic, the extra burden of high effort is reduced. In 
particular, for 𝑠𝑖 ∈ [𝑠, 𝑠], 𝐶
𝐻(𝑠𝑖) > 𝐶
𝐿(𝑠𝑖) and 
𝑑𝐶𝐻
𝑑𝑠𝑖
⁄ < 𝑑𝐶
𝐿
𝑑𝑠𝑖
⁄ < 0. One can 
imagine diminishing returns from interpreting a signal more optimistically, so that both 
𝐶𝐻 and 𝐶𝐿 are convex. That is, 𝑑
2𝐶𝑇
𝑑𝑠𝑖
2⁄ > 0 for 𝑇 ∈ {𝐿, 𝐻}. The cost is positive for 
all possible values of the signal. The effort level is endogenously determined in 
equilibrium. 
                                                          
4 Note that executives’ reception of the signal and their communication are collapsed into the same period 
although in real life they happen over a period of time. The simplification allows focusing on executives’ 
final interpretation of the signal rather than how the communication might change their initial 
interpretation. 
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At time two, individual benefits and firm profits are realized. Executives derive 
a payoff from project implementation, which I label the professional benefit, 𝐵𝑝𝑟𝑜(𝑠𝑖). 
This can be thought of as higher pay or reputational benefit in case projects go through, 
compared to the no implementation case. It is the expectation of such benefits given the 
executive’s signal interpretation, 𝑠𝑖. Intuitively the function is increasing in 𝑠𝑖. The 
function is positive as long as the executive thinks firm’s potential projects have positive 
NPV as a whole. On a small number of occasions, for example when the firm’s industry 
in distress, the function can also be negative. Nevertheless, the sign of the function does 
not affect the inferences of the model. In addition to the professional benefit, executives 
derive a private benefit from project implementation if they put in high effort. This can 
be thought of as a psychic benefit to a motivated executive who is happy to see the 
projects she cares about being implemented. Let 𝐵𝑝(𝑠𝑖) denote the private benefit 
function. This function is also increasing in 𝑠𝑖. Let 𝐵𝑝(𝑠𝑖) be expressed as 
 𝐵𝑝(𝑠𝑖) = 𝑞𝑠𝑖 (1) 
For simplicity, the private benefit is normalized to zero when the signal is interpreted 
as zero. 
Suppose that more than half the executives have to put in high effort for 
impending projects to be implemented. This critical mass condition can easily be 
generalized. Executives put in high effort if it generates higher expected payoff than 
putting in low effort. The expectation depends on how likely they think the critical mass 
condition is satisfied. Suppose each executive believes that enough executives will put 
in high effort with probability, 
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 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝 + 𝜈𝑖 (2) 
The deviation of the subjective probability from the true probability is simply 
𝑣𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣). The true probability, 𝑝, will depend on the signal, 𝑠. If 𝑠 goes higher, 
executives on average will expend more effort so 𝑝 will increase. Since 𝑝 is restricted 
between 0 and 1, let a generalized cumulative distribution function, 𝐹𝑝(𝑠), capture the 
relationship between 𝑠 and 𝑝. 
With these parameters, an executive will put in high effort if 
 𝑝𝑖 (𝐵𝑝𝑟𝑜(𝑠𝑖) + 𝐵𝑝(𝑠𝑖)) − 𝐶
𝐻(𝑠𝑖) ≥ 𝑝𝑖𝐵𝑝𝑟𝑜(𝑠𝑖) − 𝐶
𝐿(𝑠𝑖) 
𝑝𝑖𝐵𝑝(𝑠𝑖) − 𝐶
𝐻(𝑠𝑖) ≥ −𝐶
𝐿(𝑠𝑖) 
(3) 
Intuitively, if the expected private benefit exceeds the extra cost of putting in 
high effort, the executive will exert high effort. This condition is more likely to be 
satisfied as 𝑠𝑖 increases. First, an increase in 𝑠𝑖 reduces the cost differential between 
high and low effort, and second, it increases the private benefit. Specifically, after 
inserting the functional forms of each term, we find that executive i will exert high effort 
if 
 
𝑠𝑖 ≥
𝐶𝐻(𝑠𝑖) − 𝐶
𝐿(𝑠𝑖)
𝑞(𝐹𝑝(𝑠) + 𝜈𝑖)
 
(4) 
The signal interpreted by the executive has to be above a certain threshold for 
him to put in high effort. 𝜈𝑖 introduces some noise around the threshold, in particular, if 
the subjective probability of the executive for the critical mass condition is higher than 
the true value, a slightly lower signal could result in high effort. 
In real firms, one can imagine that most of the time the majority of the executive 
team is optimistic. Only occasionally a considerable number are pessimistic, and with 
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different viewpoints comes disagreement. Pessimistic executives are those that interpret 
a low 𝑠𝑖 that is not enough to satisfy condition (4). If not enough executives put in high 
effort, projects are not implemented. In short, disagreement episodes result in 
suspension of projects. 
Unlike other executives, the CEO always puts in high effort. This can be justified 
with the CEO having more responsibility and her career being jeopardized if things do 
not go well especially due to low effort. In terms of the previous modeling parameters, 
one can think that the private benefit of the CEO is higher than the cost difference 
between high and low effort at any signal level. Her decision instead is to optimally 
choose the number of projects taken, in other words, adjusting the investment rate. If 
the future looks bright, the CEO should perhaps boost investment. Otherwise, she 
should maintain the current investment level or reduce it. Therefore the optimal 
investment level positively correlates with the true signal, 𝑠. CEO’s investment decision 
happens simultaneously with other executives’ effort decision. 
Tjosvold and Johnson (1977) and Tjosvold (1982) experimentally show that 
when people experience disagreement, they are motivated to understand others’ 
positions. The same can be true for a CEO when she experiences disagreement with the 
executive team. Being loyal to the parameters of the previous model, suppose that the 
benefit (sum of 𝐵𝑝𝑟𝑜 and 𝐵𝑝 in equation 3) to the CEO is composed of two parts: (1) 
The CEO derives a benefit of control by following her own interpretation of the signal; 
(2) She tries to hit the right investment level. Let 𝑤 denote the weight the CEO puts to 
her own interpretation of the signal. She puts weight 1 − 𝑤 to the mean of the other 
executives’ interpretation. The benefit of the CEO as a function of 𝑤 is as follows 
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 𝑤1/2 − 𝑘[𝑤𝜖𝐶𝐸𝑂 + (1 − 𝑤)(𝜖𝐶𝐸𝑂 + 𝑑)] (5) 
The first term is the CEO’s control benefit of following her own signal 
interpretation. I assume the relationship is concave. The second term is the cost of being 
a certain distance away from the true signal realization. 𝑑 denotes the distance between 
𝜖𝐶𝐸𝑂 and the mean of 𝜖𝑖. 𝑘 is simply a proportionality factor between the two sources 
of CEO benefit. 
Disagreement between the CEO and other executives increases if d increases 
(decreases) in case d is positive (negative). The question is how should the CEO 
optimally choose 𝑤 given a change in d. Taking the derivative of (5) with respect to w 
and solving for the optimal w yields 
 
𝑤∗ =
1
4𝑘2𝑑2
 
(6) 
It is indeed the case that as disagreement increases, 𝑤∗ is reduced, that is, the 
CEO puts a higher weight on other executives’ interpretation of the signal. Incorporating 
others’ interpretation to her own increases the accuracy of the CEO’s decision. Even 
though she interprets the signal most precisely, the larger noise in other executives’ 
signals gets reduced through aggregation. Listening more to the other executives leads 
the CEO to choose a more accurate investment level given what the future holds for the 
company. Here, investment can be generalized to other firm decisions whose level 
should be adjusted according to future expectations. 
In summary, disagreement leads to a lower likelihood of project implementation, 
however, in the event that projects are implemented, disagreement improves the 
accuracy of the decision variable. 
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3. Hypothesis Development 
My hypotheses are structured around two main alternatives that parallel how my 
model distinguishes between the effect of disagreement on (a) the executives’ choice of 
effort and (b) the CEO’s choice of investment level. The first alternative relates project 
implementation to disagreement through executives’ choice of effort: 
 
Ha: In the presence of executive disagreement, projects are less likely to be 
implemented. 
 
To make Ha testable, one needs a proxy for executive disagreement. The large literature 
on insider trading suggests that the times at which insiders buy (sell) their own 
company’s stock can signal times when they are optimistic (pessimistic) about their firm 
(Seyhun 1988; Ke, Huddart, and Petroni 2003). Although insiders sometimes trade for 
liquidity or diversification reasons (Jenter 2005), information based trading is common. 
I use the methodology in Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012)5 to focus on trades that 
are likely to be information driven. Disagreement is then defined as time periods during 
which a firm has both net buyers and net sellers. For the outcome variable, inadequate 
implementation of projects is measured via a contraction in the firm’s investment level. 
Hence, a testable version of Ha is as follows: 
 
                                                          
5 The methodology is explained in Section 5. 
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Ha.1: The degree to which insiders within the same firm display information-
based trades in opposite directions is positively associated with the extent of 
reduced investment. 
 
A powerful or heavy-handed CEO can mitigate the association between 
disagreement and reduced investment predicted by Ha.1 and other propositions derived 
from Ha. Such a CEO can intimidate or threaten executives with job termination in case 
they put in low effort even if the project turns out to be successful. In terms of the 
modeling parameters, in Equation (3), 𝐵𝑝𝑟𝑜(𝑠𝑖) is lower if the executive spends low 
effort compared to high effort, assuming the project is successful. Therefore, the 
executive has more incentives to put in high effort. 
 
Ha.2: The presence of a more powerful or heavy-handed CEO mitigates the 
negative relationship between executive disagreement and project 
implementation rate. 
Common proxies used for CEO power include dual CEO-chairman position (Finkelstein 
1992), founder status of CEO (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira 2005), CEO tenure 
(Hermalin and Weisbach 1998), and CEO compensation (Bebchuk and Fried 2003). 
Additionally, certain CEO behavioral characteristics can make the CEO look more 
powerful. For example, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) relate CEO narcissism 
(measured with the prominence of the CEO in various company disclosures) to strategic 
grandiosity and submission in the executive team. In their study of within-firm power 
and politics, Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) interview CEOs and executive teams and 
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characterize a heavy-handed or autocratic CEO as one that takes decisions in an 
authoritarian manner, as opposed to one who consults the executive team or who allows 
for consensus decision-making. Heavy-handedness is also likely to be correlated with 
some of the variables indicating CEO power such as dual CEO-chairman position. 
Using such CEO level variables, I test whether a powerful or heavy-handed CEO 
prevents disagreement among executives from affecting the firm’s investment level6. 
 The alternative to Ha focuses on the effect of disagreement on the level of 
investment through the CEO’s decision. Equation (5) illustrates that with higher 
disagreement, the CEO puts a higher and more proper weight to other executives’ signal 
interpretation. Putting a higher weight on other executives’ interpretation is appropriate 
because the noise in their interpretation gets reduced through aggregation. Therefore, 
the final investment decision gets closer to optimal. It is consistent with the experimental 
findings of Schweiger and Sandberg (1989) who find that the consensus that emerges 
from disagreement is usually superior to the individual perspectives themselves. Hence, 
the alternative to Ha is: 
Hb: Disagreement leads to more optimal investment and acquisition decisions, 
given the economic environment. 
Note that in the model, executives’ choice of effort and the CEO’s choice of investment 
level happen simultaneously. One can argue that the effort choice dominates the 
                                                          
6 It is worth mentioning that a heavy-handed and overly optimistic CEO can change the investment 
patterns of her company in an alternative manner. Equation (5) illustrates that the weight the CEO puts 
on the competing objectives of following her own voice versus minimizing signal noise is governed by 
the parameter, 𝑘. One can imagine that a heavy-handed CEO derives higher benefit from following her 
own voice, thus 𝑘 is smaller for such a CEO. If the CEO is also overly optimistic, she can follow her own 
rosy forecasts while ignoring more realistic forecasts from the executive team and indulge in wasteful 
investments (Jensen 1986). 
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investment decision: no matter how close to the optimal investment level the CEO gets 
due to disagreement, if not enough effort is spent by the executive team, investment 
projects will not be adequately implemented. However, it is an empirical issue to find 
out the frequency at which disagreement leads to severe cuts in investment as in Ha, or 
alternatively, leads to more optimal investment decisions as in Hb. 
 In the model, the CEO chooses the investment level. If the CEO’s signal 
interpretation is too high (low), lack of disagreement can result in over (under)-
investment. As shown by Equation (6), disagreement induces the CEO to put a proper 
weight on other executives’ signals. Hence, disagreement and the resulting more 
informed decision-making by the CEO can avoid over or under-investment. Deviations 
from optimal investment happen for a variety of reasons. Jensen (1986) and Myers and 
Majluf (1984) illustrate such deviations in the presence of agency issues. In my model, 
deviations from optimal investment happen due to the CEO’s limited information set. 
Disagreement and the ensuing information collection and further processing by the CEO 
brings the investment level closer to optimal. Using a methodology similar to Biddle, 
Hilary, and Verdi (2009), I check whether disagreement helps pare down excess 
investment for firms that are prone to over-investment, such as firms with higher cash 
holdings or lower leverage (Jensen 1986; Myers 1977). Acquisition decisions can be 
susceptible to similar CEO biases wherein a CEO with high signal interpretation can 
make an inflated offer for a target. In such a case, disagreement can cut down the 
acquisition premium and lead to a more optimal offer. 
 As proposed in Hb, disagreement can increase the quality of a firm’s decisions. 
However, this sometimes comes at the expense of slowing down the decision-making 
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process. Hambrick, Cho, and Chen (1996) find delays in a firm’s response to 
competitors’ moves as the executive team becomes more heterogeneous. As with a 
heterogeneous team, disagreement causes long response times through excessive 
deliberation and personal frictions. Certain firms can sacrifice a bit of quality in their 
decisions but a slowdown is too costly. For example, Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2009) find 
that firms with high growth opportunities endogenously choose smaller boards because 
they need a nimbler decision-making process to navigate the quickly changing 
investment environment. Larger boards can generate more information about the firm’s 
product market, compliance with regulations, and so forth, however, it lengthens the 
firm’s response time, which is critical for a high growth firm. Likewise, a firm in 
financial distress oftentimes needs to make quick decisions. In a study of firms 
experiencing negative earnings that later become profitable through voluntary 
restructuring, John, Lang, and Netter (1992) find that these firms cut their employment 
by about 5% and reduce their debt to assets ratio by 8% in the first year after negative 
earnings. Furthermore, managers in firms that file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy have only 
180 days to obtain creditor and shareholder approval for their reorganization plan 
(Wruck 1990). In yet another context, Bernile, Bhagwat, and Yonker (2016) find that 
board diversity impairs firm value in times of high market volatility when quick 
decision-making is helpful. Note that here disagreement reduces firm value even if 
executives’ effort and implementation decisions don’t eventually get impaired as in Ha. 
Hb.1: Disagreement hurts firm value when quick decision-making is needed. 
I measure executive disagreement via insider trading behavior, however, 
executives can behave differently in their personal trading versus corporate decisions. 
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Slovic (1972) demonstrates that individuals can display inconsistent behavior if 
relatively similar tasks are introduced in different contexts. Similarly, a pessimistic 
executive who makes insider trades according to her beliefs may not exhibit pessimism 
in corporate decisions due to the dynamics of group decision-making. The absence of a 
relationship between individual and corporate decision-making forms the null 
hypothesis: 
H0: Insider trading behavior is not correlated with corporate investment policy. 
 
4. Data and Empirical Procedure 
I start by looking for executive disagreement in insider trading. Although 
insiders could trade for liquidity reasons, information-based trading is very common 
(Allen and Ramanan 1995, Pettit and Venkatesh 1995, Seyhun 1988, Ke, Huddart, and 
Petroni 2003). Net purchases by insiders can signal executive optimism while net sells 
signal pessimism. Firms that have both net purchasers and net sellers in a certain time 
interval can be classified as firms with disagreement. In their net purchase measure, 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) use a six-month interval, arguing that a one-month interval 
can yield in many companies having no trades. I use three-month intervals to identify 
firms that simultaneously have net purchasers and net sellers. I look for effects on 
investment levels for the quarter of disagreement as well as the next three quarters. 
I use insider trades from January 1986 to December 2016. Daily insider trades 
are obtained from Thomson Reuters Insider Filing database. Insiders, which include 
officers with decision-making authority, board members, and owners of more than 10% 
of a company’s stock, are required to file SEC Form 4 for each insider transaction they 
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make. These filings are recorded in Table 1 of the Insider Filing database. Similar to 
previous literature (for example, Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012)), I focus on open 
market purchases and sales by insiders, and exclude options exercises. 
In order to increase the likelihood that the insider trades I investigate are 
information-based, I follow the screening procedure in Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski 
(2012). They label certain insiders routine traders if there is an observable pattern in 
their trading behavior, for instance, trading in the same month every year. Insiders for 
whom no apparent pattern is observed are labelled as opportunistic. Unlike earlier 
papers (such as Lakonishok and Lee (2001)) who don’t find return predictability for 
insider sales, Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012) are able to find strong predictive 
power for both opportunistic buys and sells. 
I collect data on firm fundamentals including capital and non-capital investment 
from Compustat. For data on institutional ownership, I refer to Thomson Reuters 13F 
database. 
Hypothesis Ha.1 predicts a negative relationship between disagreement and 
investment levels. I test this prediction on both total investment levels and its 
constituents, which include capital expenditures, R&D expenses, and acquisition 
expenses. Following Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009), I scale capital expenditures by 
lagged property, plant, and equipment. Total investment is defined as the sum of capital 
expenditures, R&D expenditures, and acquisitions minus sales of PPE, scaled by lagged 
total assets. 
A second method to uncover executive, especially director, disagreement is to 
use individual firm Form 8-Ks. Agrawal and Chen (2017) and Bar-Hava, Huang, Segal, 
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and Segal (2015) make use of this form, part of which is a written correspondence 
between companies and departing directors. If directors depart due to disagreement, 
such instances could be used to test above hypotheses. In Agrawal and Chen’s (2017) 
sample from 1995 to 2006 of 168 disagreement episodes, only 43 of them were related 
to corporate strategy. The remaining were about board functioning, agency problems, 
or other issues. Since my paper is focused on disagreements on firm prospects, a caveat 
of examining Form 8-Ks would be limited sample size. 
A third method to uncover executive disagreement is to conduct textual analysis 
on various firm disclosures, a method that has recently become quite popular in the 
finance literature (Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy, 2008; Loughran and 
McDonald, 2011; Dikolli, Keusch, Mayew, and Steffen, 2014; Green, Jame, and Lock, 
2016). These disclosures can take the form of firm 10-Ks, shareholder letters, CEO 
conference calls, or simply news stories. I look for words related to executive 
disagreement in such documents and associate their occurrence with investment levels. 
A potential concern with this method is that CEOs can avoid mentioning their 
disagreement in the executive team unless the disagreement has already facilitated 
positive outcomes. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
Table 1 displays summary statistics on investment and control variables across 
firm-years differentiated by whether the year in question is preceded by a disagreement 
period. The table shows whether disagreement periods affect the outcome variable, 
investment, and at least as importantly, it shows whether other explanatory variables are 
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influenced by disagreement. If the effect of disagreement on other explanatory variables 
is weak, this would mitigate concerns about endogeneity. 
The first two rows on capex and total investment show that disagreement periods 
are associated with generally lower investment levels. However, the difference in means 
test indicates that this observation is not statistically significant. About half of the 
explanatory variables seem not to be affected by the presence of disagreement. 
However, years following disagreement are associated with larger firm assets, higher 
leverage and higher asset tangibility. These three variables suggest that disagreement as 
measured by insider trades is more likely to happen in larger firms. Furthermore, the 
number of insiders is higher for firm-years associated with disagreement. To make sure 
that disagreement is not simply picking up the effect of a larger executive team, 
variables that proxy firm or executive team size will be controlled in most specifications 
below. 
Table 2 exhibits the test of Ha.1 for investment levels. Specifications 1 to 3 in 
Panel A examine total investment levels, which is defined as: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
=
𝑅&𝐷 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 + 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 − 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑃&𝐸
𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
  (7) 
All specifications include Fama-French 49 industry by year fixed effects to control for 
time-varying industry shocks on investment levels. Furthermore, all specifications 
cluster standard errors by firm and by year. It is plausible that there is non-random 
variation in disagreement frequency or in investment levels across firms or years. 
Specification 1 does not include control variables whereas specification 2 includes 
common control variables used in the literature to explain firm investment. These 
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variables are market-to-book ratio, cash flow, leverage, and total assets (Lang, Ofek, 
and Stulz, 1996; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Cleary, 1999). Given the way I measure 
insider trades, I also include the number of firm insiders as a control variable. 
Specification 3 runs the investment regression with additional control variables 
including Z-score, Tangibility, Slack, Dividend, Age, Loss, and Institutions. Slack is the 
ratio of cash to PP&E. Dividend is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if 
the firm paid a dividend. Loss is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if net 
income before extraordinary items is negative. Finally, Institutions is the percentage of 
firm shares held by institutional investors. In all three specifications even though the 
coefficient on lagged disagreement is negative, it is not statistically significant. 
Nevertheless, to give an idea of economic magnitudes, disagreement episodes are 
associated with a 5.2 (8.0) percent decline from the mean (median) level of total 
investment. It is worthwhile to note that although disagreement is negatively, albeit 
insignificantly, associated with investment, Number of Insiders has a positive 
coefficient. This demonstrates that disagreement is not simply capturing the size of the 
executive team. 
Although disagreement seems not strongly related to total investment levels, it 
can differentially affect the various components of investments. As alluded to in the 
introduction, Jehn (1995) illustrates that disagreement is more harmful for routine 
decisions. Acquisition decisions are generally perceived as complex (Duhaime and 
Schwenk 1985) so it is plausible that disagreement adversely affects the simpler capex 
decision. Table 2 Panel B displays regressions of capex, acquisitions, and R&D 
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expenditures on executive disagreement. Specifications 1 to 3 has the capex 
specifications, where it is defined as7: 
 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥 =
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑃&𝐸
 
 
(8) 
Results indeed turn out to be stronger for capex. Especially, the simple and partial 
models generate negative and statistically significant coefficients. In terms of economic 
significance, the partial model implies that disagreement is associated with about a 5.8 
(8.4) percent decrease from its mean (median) level. Consistent with prior expectations, 
Market-to-Book ratio is positively, and Leverage is negatively associated with capital 
expenditures. Specifications 4 to 6 and 7 to 9 do the same exercise for acquisitions and 
R&D expenditures, respectively. When defining these variables, lagged assets is in the 
denominator for acquisitions and lagged intangible assets is in the denominator for 
R&D. Acquisition results are negative but statistically insignificant. In terms of 
economic magnitude, the full specification implies that lagged disagreement is 
associated with a 10 percent reduction from the mean level in acquisition expenditures. 
Results on R&D expenditures are inconclusive. Results in Table 2 perhaps demonstrate 
the main contribution of the paper wherein executive disagreement is shown to reduce 
corporate investments, especially those that pertain to capital expenditures. The 
mechanism that I propose which links disagreement and lower levels of investment is 
executives’ reduced effort and stalled projects. The results demonstrate the negative 
consequences when executives have differing views for the future of their company. 
                                                          
7 When the ratio is taken over lagged assets, results are similar but quantitatively weaker. 
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These negative consequences become more severe especially when the firm is facing a 
relatively routine task. 
Table 3 displays results for the test of Hb. In particular, it tests whether 
disagreement helps firms avoid over-investment, especially for those firms that are 
prone to investing excessively. Following Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009), I 
characterize firms that have high cash holdings and low leverage as those that are prone 
to over-investment. The variable OverTendency is the average decile score of cash 
holdings and negative leverage (to make sure the latter variable increases with excess 
investment) of a firm in a given year. I use the following regression to estimate the 
relationship between disagreement and investment levels for firms that are prone to 
over-investment: 
 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(9) 
If, as predicted by Hb, disagreement mitigates excessive investment for firms 
prone to over-investment, the estimate for the interaction term should be negative. 
Results are reported in Table 3. Specifications 1-3 present results for total investment 
and 4-6 for capex. Specifications 1 and 4 simply repeat the corresponding specifications 
in Table 2. Specifications 2 and 5 show the simple model with only the interaction 
results between lagged disagreement and susceptibility to over-investment added. The 
interactive term is negative but insignificant for both specifications8. 
                                                          
8 Results are similarly weak when overinvestment tendency is measured across industry-years. 
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Specifications 3 and 6 further include control variables. Specification 6 
generates a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interactive term 
between lagged disagreement and OverTendency. In terms of economic significance, 
when we go from the decile of firms with the lowest tendency to overinvest to the decile 
with the highest tendency, disagreement episodes are associated with a 28 percent 
further decline in the mean level of capex. Therefore, there is some indication that for 
firms that are prone to over-investment, lagged disagreement reduces the level of 
excessive investment. Hence, disagreement seems to improve firm governance around 
the investment decision and curb wasteful investments for firms prone to over-
investment. It can be taken as suggestive evidence confirming Hb. However, the 
hypothesis is not confirmed when investment is measured as the level of total 
investment. While specification 6 generates some support for Hb, results are short of 
providing strong validation. Interestingly, both hypotheses, Ha and Hb, seem to be 
confirmed when tests are conducted on capital expenditures. 
Given that there is some support for hypotheses Ha and Ha.1, the next logical 
step is to test Ha.2, that is, whether CEO power or heavy-handedness mitigates the 
negative relationship between executive disagreement and the level of investment. 
Using three different proxies for CEO power, Table 4 displays how a powerful CEO 
can affect the disagreement-investment relationship. The specification used is the 
following: 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                             (10) 
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The test is done on both total investments and capital expenditures. The first proxy used 
for CEO power is dual CEO-chairman position (Finkelstein 1992). The presence of a 
CEO with a dual role does not affect how much disagreement episodes lower 
investment. The second proxy used is the level of CEO compensation, especially the 
ratio between CEO pay and the pay of the second-highest paid executive (Chatterjee 
and Hambrick 2007). I form quintiles of the pay ratio and take the highest quintile as 
CEOs with high relative compensation. The interaction term between lagged 
disagreement and high CEO compensation dummy is again insignificant. The third 
proxy for CEO power is the tenure of the CEO. Like the first two variables, it does not 
affect the relationship between disagreement and the level of investment. There seems 
to be no strong evidence that CEO power weakens the relationship between 
disagreement and reduced investment. This suggests that even if a CEO is relatively 
powerful, disagreement with other executives still leads to reduced investment. Even a 
powerful CEO is subject to disruption in the face of disagreement. 
Hypothesis Hb.1 links the effect of disagreement to circumstances in which 
quick decision-making is needed. Recall that Hypothesis Hb takes disagreement as a 
deliberation process through which better decisions can be generated. If promptness is 
more important than decision quality, disagreement can backfire. Three proxies are used 
to capture the circumstances that make quick decisions favorable: firms with growth 
opportunities (Lehn, Patro, and Zhao 2009), firms nearing financial distress (John, 
Lang, Netter 1992), and times with high market volatility (Bernile, Bhagwat, and 
Yonker 2018). Table 5 displays the results for the three proxies. It uses a difference-in-
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differences specification, where annual stock returns are observed before and after 
disagreement periods for treatment and control firms: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠                                                            (11) 
In each specification, treatment firms are those that need quick decision-making. 
Disagreement is one for years following disagreement episodes. 
The first column corresponds to growth opportunities, which is captured by a 
high market-to-book (MB) ratio. Instead of classifying firms as having high versus low 
MB, MB is taken as a continuous variable. One unit increase in the market-to-book ratio 
corresponds to significantly lower risk-adjusted annual returns of -7.8 percent after 
disagreement episodes. This illustrates that disagreement is more harmful for firms with 
more growth opportunities. The proxy in the second column is financial distress. A firm 
is in financial distress if net income before extraordinary items is negative. For this 
specification, the coefficient on the interactive term is negative but not statistically 
significant. Although firms with negative earnings are hurt by disagreement periods 
more than firms with positive earnings, the difference is not significant. Still the 
coefficient is similar in magnitude to that in the first specification.  The third proxy, 
stock market volatility measured by VIX, generates a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient. Rather than separating low-VIX and high-VIX environments, 
VIX is treated as a continuous variable. Disagreement hurts firm value more in highly 
volatile stock market environments. In terms of economic magnitude, a one-standard 
deviation increase in VIX is associated with 4.25 percent lower annual returns when the 
firm faces disagreement. Overall the results in Table 5 suggest that firms that need quick 
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decisions have significantly poorer performance when they experience disagreement. 
This is consistent with hypothesis Hb.1 and shows that disagreement not only reduces 
investment but also has serious ramifications for firm value. 
Executives are more likely to depart the firm when they are in disagreement 
(Dewally and Peck 2010, Agrawal and Chen 2017). Looking at executive departures 
can thus be a good way to empirically validate my measure of disagreement. When a 
disagreement episode is observed in a firm through the behavior of insider traders, I 
check for departures in Execucomp. The first test involves looking at the average years 
to departure for firm executives experiencing disagreement versus those that do not. 
Across all firms, average departure time for executives after disagreement episodes is 
4.43 years versus 4.08 years following non-disagreement periods. The difference is 
statistically significant. The results are opposite to what one would expect. One 
possibility is that disagreements my methodology picks up are not too extreme to lead 
to departure. Executives also depart for reasons other than disagreement such as 
family/health issues or outside commitments. Furthermore, matching insider trading 
with Execucomp leads to a small sample size. When I look into whether executives in 
general depart their firm within the next year, the probability is 45.5 percent following 
disagreement and 47.9 percent following non-disagreement episodes. Results are 
counterintuitive and similar to the first set of findings. 
Although my model examines the relationship between executive disagreement 
and corporate investment decisions, a preliminary extension can be made to labor and 
innovation outcomes. Such an extension can be useful given the importance of these 
variables in gauging the productivity and health of the real economy. If hypothesis Ha.1 
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holds and disagreement leads to suboptimal and insufficient investments, a firm can 
shrink in the long run thus reducing its number of employees. Table 6 provides support 
for this linkage where disagreement is associated with a 2.2 percent reduction in the 
number of employees over the course of a year. To give a comparison, the median value 
for the change in employees is 1.6 percent. 
How many patents a firm generates a year and how many citations those patents 
receive are important indicators of a firm’s innovative output. Table 6 examines whether 
disagreement hampers innovative productivity. There is no support for such a 
prediction. As expected, firm size is positively correlated with the extent of innovative 
output. 
 
6. Robustness Checks 
Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012) illustrate that return predictability of 
insider trades is especially strong for local insiders. They label an insider local if the 
insider lives in the state of company headquarters. If insider trades have better 
information value for local insiders, one can expect to see the main results of this paper 
get stronger within the subset of such insiders. Table 7 divides the set of insider trades 
into local and non-local and tracks the occurrence of disagreement within each set. Test 
of hypothesis Ha.1 is repeated on total investments and capital expenditures. 
Disagreement hurts capex in the local insider specification similar to results in Table 2. 
Economic significance is also very similar to those earlier results. However, results are 
insignificant for non-local insider specifications. Results are supportive of Cohen, 
Malloy, and Pomorski (2012) and point to the informativeness of local insider trades. It 
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is the local insiders that demonstrate their pessimism or optimism through their trades, 
which then gets reflected in corporate investment behavior. 
Main specifications in Table 2 are run with industry by year fixed effects. 
Arguably the effect of disagreement should be measured within firms, otherwise, results 
could be driven by firm-specific time-invariant omitted variables. To see if my main 
results on hypothesis Ha.1 are robust, I repeat tests on total investments and its 
constituents with firm and industry-year fixed effects. Surprisingly, results with the total 
investment specification become marginally significant for the partial and full models. 
In economic terms, lagged disagreement is associated with a 4.7 percent reduction in 
investment levels, that is, 0.33 percent reduction where the mean level of investment is 
6.98 percent. This time, however, results are driven by the negative effect of 
disagreement on acquisition expenditures. Mean level of acquisition expenditures as a 
ratio of previous quarter’s assets is 0.02 percent and the coefficient estimate of -0.003 
with the full set of controls implies a 17 percent reduction from the mean level. 
Previously strong results on capex disappear with the stronger set of controls. The 
premise that disagreement would hamper the more routine capex decision is not robustly 
supported. Results on R&D expenditures are still insignificant. 
I define disagreement when a firm has net buyers and net sellers, where the 
trades are information-driven, within a three-month window. One can argue that such 
an approach would favor large firms with many insiders. In my empirical specifications, 
I control for the number of insiders yet, for robustness, I construct an alternative 
continuous measure of disagreement. In particular, I define disagreement as 
min (%𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠, %𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠). A single net buyer in a five-person executive team would 
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have the same effect as two net buyers in a ten-person team. The minimum operator 
makes sure that there is both buyers and sellers in the firm at the same time. 
Insider trades are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Insider Filing database for 
the entire universe of US public firms whereas executive rosters can only be obtained 
from Execucomp for S&P 1500 firms for a more limited sample period. Matching with 
Execucomp results in a largely contracted sample with insufficient number of 
disagreement episodes. In order to preserve sample size, I retrieve the executive roster 
also from the Insider Filing database. In my main specifications, I only consider open 
market purchases and sales by insiders but insiders can appear on Insider Filings for 
other reasons such as stock grants and option exercises. I treat as if insiders that appear 
on Insider Filings are a good representation of the firm’s entire executive team. The 
continuous disagreement measure has a mean of 3.2 percent and a median of 0. 
Regression results are given in Table 9. Sample sizes have greatly expanded as 
it is no longer required that a firm has a net buyer and seller within a three-month 
window. Total investment specification generates significance in the simple and partial 
models. Economic magnitudes have risen significantly possibly being affected by 
outliers. Results on capex and acquisitions are not statistically significant. Interestingly, 
results on R&D are stronger compared to previous specifications but are still not at 
conventional significance levels. In terms of economic magnitude, a one-standard 
deviation increase in disagreement is associated with a 12 percent reduction from the 
mean level of R&D expenditures. 
As a final robustness check, I orthogonalize the disagreement variable against 
the number of insiders in order to purge disagreement from the size of the executive 
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team. Table 10 shows that results are statistically significant only for capex 
specifications. Economic significance levels are very similar to Table 2 for total 
investments and its constituents. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper attempts to uncover the relationship between executive disagreement 
and firm investment. I show that investments, especially capital expenditures, decline 
following disagreement in the executive team. The relationship is both statistically and 
economically significant. I propose that reduced effort in the executive team that follows 
disagreement is the culprit for reduced investments. As less effort is spent by pessimistic 
as well as optimistic executives, projects are not implemented adequately and lower 
investment levels follow. The same relationship is true even when a powerful CEO is 
in place. Nevertheless, there can be factors other than reduced effort in play. 
Disagreement can also lead to gridlock and prevent progress on the part of the executive 
team. 
I find weak support for the decision enhancing effects of disagreement. 
Although there is some indication that disagreement lowers excessive capital 
expenditures, results for total investment are inconclusive. The effort-reducing dark side 
of disagreement is plausibly more dominant compared to the decision-enhancing bright 
side. However, the finding that disagreement hurts capital expenditures more than 
acquisitions indirectly hints at the decision enhancing effects of disagreement. 
Acquisitions are complex decisions so disagreement can have a dual effect in which the 
positive and negative effects cancel out. According to the positive channel, 
disagreement is initially predicted to have a beneficial effect on the final decision given 
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that it is a deliberation process through which better decisions can be reached. However, 
this comes at the cost of slowing down the decision-making process. Results show that 
the slowdown is costly for firms in need of quick decisions, especially firms with high 
growth opportunities and in times of high market risk. 
Results associating disagreement with reduced investments is sometimes not 
robust to stronger empirical specifications. It could be due to measurement error when 
identifying disagreement episodes. Executives can also have different motives when 
they carry out insider trades versus when they act within the executive team. 
My paper’s contribution is twofold. It is the first paper to measure executive 
disagreement through insider trades. Extracting information-driven trades helps infer 
which executives are optimistic and which are pessimistic, making it plausible to detect 
disagreement among executives. The second contribution is the empirical validation of 
a theory of executive disagreement. There is some support for the effort-reducing effects 
of disagreement, and that channel seems to dominate the optimal decision-enhancing 
channel. In that sense, disagreement is found to be more harmful than helpful to firms. 
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Figure 1: Disagreement at Chiquita Brands International and Effects on Firm 
Outcomes 
This graph plots the share price, ROA, and capital expenditures around December 2011 when 
an executive disagreement episode is detected through information-driven insider trades in 
opposing directions. Capital expenditures is defined as the ratio of the level of capex divided by 
lagged property, plant, and equipment. 
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Figure 2: Timeline of the Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑡0 𝑡1 𝑡2 
Executives receive and interpret 
a signal on firm prospects. They 
communicate among themselves, 
reach their final interpretation, 
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decision, CEO 
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Individual benefits 
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realized. 
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Table 1: Firm Fundamentals in Years Following Disagreement vs. Non-Disagreement 
This table compares firm fundamentals in each firm-year following a disagreement or non-disagreement period. The definition of a 
disagreement period is given in the text. The table shows means and medians as well as the p-value from a difference in means test 
between disagreement and non-disagreement years. Cash Flow is net income plus depreciation and amortization plus change in deferred 
taxes divided by lagged assets. Z-score is a measure of distress computed following the methodology in Altman (1968). Lower scores 
indicate higher distress. Slack is the ratio of cash to PPE. Dividend is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm paid a 
dividend. Loss is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if net income before extraordinary items is negative. Institutions is the 
percentage of firm shares held by institutional investors. The last row shows the number of distinct firms appearing in each year type. 
 Disagreement Years Non-Disagreement Years  
 Mean Median Observations Mean Median Observations p-value difference in means 
Investment (%) 6.635 4.249 2,503 6.906 4.290 50,978 0.577 
Capex (%) 15.958 11.418 2,497 18.820 12.336 50,811 0.284 
Log(Assets) 6.617 6.541 2,498 6.460 6.502 50,963 less than 0.001 
Market-to-Book 2.342 1.676 2,484 2.515 1.772 50,662 0.107 
Cash Flow (%) 0.021 0.027 2,324 0.013 0.026 47,992 0.292 
Number of Insiders 2.660 2.000 4,387 1.859 1.000 66,476 less than 0.001 
Z-score 1548.134 220.615 2,365 1826.523 227.442 48,172 0.091 
Tangibility 0.315 0.238 2,491 0.273 0.199 50,873 less than 0.001 
Leverage 0.183 0.111 2,447 0.156 0.089 50,233 less than 0.001 
Slack 1.782 0.226 2,491 5.784 0.454 50,746 0.217 
Dividend 0.487 0.000 2,505 0.421 0.000 51,101 less than 0.001 
Age 21.993 18.000 2,395 21.588 17.000 49,360 0.258 
Losses 0.182 0.000 2,502 0.210 0.000 50,993 0.001 
Institutions 0.545 0.594 2,377 0.550 0.625 48,694 0.459 
Number of distinct firms   947   6,945  
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Table 2: Investment Regressions (Ha.1) 
This table presents regressions of investment on Lagged Disagreement and controls. The dependent 
variable in Panel A is Total investment. Total investment is defined as the sum of capital expenditures, 
R&D, and acquisition expenses net of PP&E sales, all scaled by lagged assets. The dependent variables 
in Panel B are constituents of investment, which are Capex, Acquisitions, and R&D expenditures. All 
specifications use Fama-French 49 industry by year fixed effects, and cluster standard errors by firm and 
year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A  
 Dependent variable 
 Total investment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Disagreementt-1 -0.173 -0.216 -0.363 
 (-0.586) (-0.708) (-1.361) 
Log(Assets)  0.243** 0.100* 
  (2.337) (1.902) 
Market-to-Book  -0.041 0.355*** 
  (-1.323) (3.880) 
Cash Flow  -34.682*** -6.025 
  (-3.804) (-1.133) 
Leverage  -0.909 0.941 
  (-0.958) (0.958) 
Number of Insiders  0.253*** 0.133** 
  (4.297) (2.482) 
Z-score   0.000*** 
   (-6.359) 
Tangibility   7.935*** 
   (12.691) 
Slack   0.000* 
   (-1.881) 
Dividend   -0.798*** 
   (-4.439) 
Age   -0.037*** 
   (-7.074) 
Loss   0.416 
   (1.024) 
Institutions   1.274*** 
   (4.320) 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm and Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 53,446 46,925 43,055 
R2 0.0359 0.2673 0.1301 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Panel B 
 Dependent variable 
 Capex Acquisitions R&D 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Disagreementt-1 -1.704*** -1.065** -0.640 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.102 -0.020 0.113 
 (-3.375) (-2.330) (-1.449) (-0.357) (-1.188) (-1.295) (0.299) (-0.052) (0.281) 
Log(Assets)  -1.223*** -0.722***  0.002*** 0.002***  -0.330** -0.224** 
  (-7.110) (-4.141)  (6.197) (6.110)  (-2.584) (-2.690) 
Market-to-Book  0.359** 0.769***  0.000* 0.000*  -0.029 0.164 
  (2.602) (3.658)  (-1.844) (-1.836)  (-1.239) (1.558) 
Cash Flow  3.302 9.709  0.001* 0.021*  -7.113** -11.938 
  (1.124) (1.443)  (1.749) (1.709)  (-2.441) (-1.450) 
Leverage  -12.633*** -11.007***  0.034*** 0.051***  -0.557 0.397 
  (-11.985) (-9.047)  (4.851) (5.545)  (-0.409) (0.255) 
Number of Insiders  0.027 -0.026  0.001** 0.001*  0.028 0.036 
  (0.221) (-0.223)  (2.231) (1.999)  (0.333) (0.361) 
Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 53,273 46,790 43,052 50,974 44,937 41,221 15,230 13,863 13,341 
R2 0.0107 0.0698 0.0843 0.0509 0.0635 0.0778 0.0305 0.0426 0.0769 
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Table 3: Over-investment 
This table presents regressions of Total investment and Capex on the interaction of Lagged Disagreement, susceptibility to over-
investment (OverTendency), and controls. Controls are the same as in Table 3 except Leverage is no longer present since OverTendency 
is constructed as a decile average of Leverage and Cash. All specifications use Fama-French 49 industry by year fixed effects, and cluster 
standard errors by firm and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable 
 Total investment Capex 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Disagreementt-1 -0.173 0.117 -0.938 -1.704*** 0.692 2.163* 
 (-0.586) (0.172) (-1.420) (-3.375) (0.476) (1.720) 
OverTendency  -0.029 -0.249***  1.785*** 1.238*** 
  (-0.203) (-2.843)  (3.640) (6.268) 
Disagreementt-1 * OverTendency  -0.052 0.107  -0.374 -0.548** 
  (-0.418) (0.771)  (-1.335) (-2.041) 
Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 53,446 52,564 43,055 53,273 52,400 43,052 
R2 0.0359 0.0359 0.1313 0.0107 0.0115 0.0849 
 
50 
 
Table 4: CEO Power 
This table presents regressions of Total investment and Capex on disagreement, a proxy for CEO power, and their interaction. High CEO 
Compensation is one for CEOs whose pay relative to the second-highest paid executive is in the top quintile. All specifications use Fama-
French 49 industry by year fixed effects, and cluster standard errors by firm and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent variable 
 Total investment Capex 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Disagreementt-1 0.056 -0.206 -0.400 -0.648 -0.664 0.371 
 (0.180) (-0.654) (-0.791) (-0.976) (-1.462) (0.332) 
Dual CEO-Chairman 0.129   -0.114   
 (0.869)   (-0.312)   
Disagreementt-1 * Dual CEO-Chairman -0.689   -0.047   
 (-1.089)   (-0.040)   
High CEO Compensation  0.247   -0.371  
  (1.399)   (-1.144)  
Disagreementt-1 * High CEO Compensation  0.506   0.015  
  (0.753)   (0.017)  
CEO Tenure   0.004   0.219 
   (0.043)   (1.272) 
Disagreementt-1 * CEO Tenure   0.131   -0.572 
   (0.478)   (-0.984) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 26459 26380 23752 26459 26345 23752 
R2 0.1461 0.0952 0.1476 0.2569 0.2566 0.2558 
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Table 5: Disagreement When Quick Decision-Making Is Needed 
This table regresses annual firm stock returns on a proxy for firm-level demand for quick decision-making, disagreement periods, and 
their interaction. Disagreement is one if it corresponds to a year after a disagreement episode. Treatment is one for those firms for which 
quick decision making is favorable in the category denoted at the top of the table. Growth opportunities are proxied by the market-to-
book ratio. A firm is classified as being in financial distress if net income before extraordinary items is negative. Market volatility is 
measured by VIX. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Treatment 
 Growth Opportunities Financial Distress Market Volatility 
Rm-Rf 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (11.205) (12.153) (10.773) 
SMB 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (4.286) (3.565) (4.074) 
HML 0.001 0.002*** 0.002** 
 (0.702) (2.672) (2.150) 
Disagreement 0.101*** -0.031 0.108 
 (3.241) (-1.263) (1.342) 
Treatment 0.056*** -0.039 0.001 
 (8.536) (-0.046) (0.257) 
Disagreement * Treatment -0.078*** -0.087 -0.007* 
 (-7.973) (-1.388) (-1.890) 
Observations 2,948 3,749 3,777 
R2 0.0812 0.0531 0.0520 
 
52 
 
Table 6: Labor and Innovation 
The dependent variable is the annual change in the number of firm employees in specifications 
(1) and (2), patents that a firm generates annually in specifications (3) and (4), and citations that 
those patents receive in specifications (5) and (6). All specifications use Fama-French 49 
industry by year fixed effects, and cluster standard errors by firm and year. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent variable 
 Change in Employees Patents Citations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Disagreementt-1 -0.032* -0.022** 2.499 -0.531 95.912 85.963 
 (-1.982) (-2.172) (0.131) (-0.037) (0.651) (0.580) 
Log(Assets)  0.014***  26.173***  142.482** 
  (2.770)  (3.485)  (2.365) 
Market-to-Book  0.015***  -0.925  0.580 
  (4.539)  (-0.424)  (0.068) 
Cash Flow  0.000  -0.003  -0.107 
  (0.751)  (-0.148)  (-1.105) 
Z-score  0.000  0.003  0.006 
  (-0.989)  (1.019)  (0.529) 
Age  -0.003***  0.370  1.878 
  (-5.492)  (0.812)  (0.694) 
Loss  -0.020  3.727  -50.960 
  (-1.230)  (0.250)  (-0.675) 
Institutions  -0.022  -120.604  -575.329 
  (-0.726)  (-1.656)  (-1.394) 
R&D Expense    0.050  0.297 
    (0.726)  (0.992) 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27,215 23,445 1,395 1,067 1,395 1,067 
R2 0.0389 0.0471 0.1493 0.5513 0.1952 0.4092 
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Table 7: Local vs. Non-Local Executives 
Total investment and Capex are regressed on Lagged Disagreement and controls, separately for 
local (Panel A) and non-local (Panel B) executives. An executive is local if she resides in the 
state of company headquarters. All specifications use Fama-French 49 industry by year fixed 
effects, and cluster standard errors by firm and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A 
 Local executives 
 Total investment Capex 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Disagreementt-1 -0.043 -0.098 -0.085 -1.795** -1.315** -0.445 
 (-0.118) (-0.255) (-0.269) (-2.681) (-2.189) (-0.827) 
Log(Assets)  0.222* 0.122*  -1.100*** -0.552*** 
  (1.945) (1.835)  (-7.565) (-3.872) 
Market-to-Book  0.027 0.326***  0.341** 1.298*** 
  (0.156) (5.390)  (2.057) (10.840) 
Cash Flow  -37.145*** 0.154  6.679* 4.542 
  (-3.601) (0.172)  (1.986) (1.545) 
Leverage  -0.479 1.102  -13.214*** -9.861*** 
  (-0.348) (0.986)  (-11.617) (-8.838) 
Number of Insiders  0.204*** 0.098*  0.064 -0.016 
  (3.228) (2.027)  (0.508) (-0.144) 
Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 37,838 33,748 31,262 37,740 33,667 31,260 
R2 0.0399 0.2888 0.1562 0.1106 0.1598 0.2035 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
Panel B 
 
 Non-local executives 
 Total investment Capex 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Disagreementt-1 0.614 0.543 -0.306 2.008 1.401 0.525 
 (0.676) (0.569) (-0.365) (1.199) (0.745) (0.299) 
Log(Assets)  0.110 0.175  -1.745*** -1.842** 
  (1.144) (1.101)  (-3.705) (-2.111) 
Market-to-Book  0.393** 0.340***  0.916** 1.170*** 
  (2.144) (5.451)  (2.422) (3.626) 
Cash Flow  -12.878 6.730  2.478 30.610 
  (-1.353) (1.250)  (0.504) (0.685) 
Leverage  1.994 2.693*  -10.926*** -7.056** 
  (1.301) (1.736)  (-3.924) (-2.612) 
Number of Insiders  0.199** 0.162*  -0.380 -0.749 
  (2.422) (1.711)  (-1.069) (-1.180) 
Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,725 10,106 9,081 11,670 10,068 9,080 
R2 0.1342 0.2271 0.1881 0.0838 0.1014 0.1665 
55 
 
Table 8: Firm Fixed Effects 
Total investment (Panel A), Capex, Acquisitions, and R&D expenses (Panel B) are regressed on 
Lagged Disagreement and controls. All specifications use firm and industry-year fixed effects 
and cluster standard errors by firm and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A 
 Dependent variable 
 Total investment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Disagreementt-1 -0.349 -0.430* -0.325* 
 (-1.565) (-1.823) (-1.795) 
Log(Assets)  1.385*** 1.572*** 
  (3.930) (9.877) 
Market-to-Book  0.011 0.174*** 
  (0.067) (2.689) 
Cash Flow  -46.659*** -1.845 
  (-4.047) (-0.956) 
Leverage  0.993 3.689** 
  (0.797) (2.530) 
Number of Insiders  0.188** 0.119** 
  (2.329) (2.206) 
Controls No No Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Time Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52,726 46,187 42,399 
R2 0.209 0.3221 0.3235 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
Panel B 
 Dependent variable 
 Capex Acquisitions R&D 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Disagreementt-1 0.187 0.151 0.331 -0.003* -0.004** -0.003** 0.038 0.084 0.088 
 (0.358) (0.258) (0.450) (-1.970) (-2.550) (-2.478) (0.433) (1.035) (0.452) 
Log(Assets)  2.492* 1.862  0.018*** 0.018***  -0.404 -0.171 
  (1.936) (1.422)  (10.944) (10.316)  (-1.180) (-0.513) 
Market-to-Book  0.326** 0.234  0.000* 0.000  0.012 0.135 
  (2.191) (0.890)  (1.977) (1.487)  (0.586) (1.249) 
Cash Flow  7.925** 18.684*  0.001 0.018  -4.530** -6.719* 
  (2.402) (1.891)  (1.699) (1.489)  (-2.683) (-1.805) 
Leverage  -9.283*** -7.335***  0.057*** 0.065***  -1.663** -1.025 
  (-5.344) (-3.815)  (4.313) (4.332)  (-2.193) (-1.462) 
Number of Insiders  0.177 0.140  0.001 0.000  0.048 0.032 
  (1.594) (1.174)  (1.451) (0.977)  (0.671) (0.439) 
Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52,558 46,056 42,395 50,245 44,181 40,549 14,903 13,532 13,032 
R2 0.1545 0.2866 0.2888 0.2157 0.2363 0.242 0.649 0.6676 0.5089 
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Table 9: Continuous Measure of Disagreement 
An alternative continuous measure of disagreement is constructed as 
min (%𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠, %𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠). To calculate percentage buyers (sellers), the number of executives 
with information-driven buys (sells) is divided by the total number of executives appearing on 
Insider Filings data within a three-month window. The dependent variable is Total investment 
in Panel A and Capex, Acquisitions, or R&D expenses in Panel B. All specifications use Fama-
French 49 industry by year fixed effects, and cluster standard errors by firm and year. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A 
 Dependent variable 
 Total investment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Disagreementt-1 -10.173* -10.577** -10.280 
 (-1.947) (-2.042) (-1.599) 
Log(Assets)  -4.947* -8.040*** 
  (-1.910) (-3.965) 
Market-to-Book  0.002 31.538** 
  (0.502) (2.584) 
Cash Flow  5.026 1326.171*** 
  (0.494) (8.057) 
Leverage  -5.670 85.040*** 
  (-0.399) (2.845) 
Controls No No Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 378,637 338,573 288,914 
R2 0.0019 0.0036 0.8936 
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Table 9 (Continued) 
Panel B 
 
 Dependent variable 
 Capex Acquisitions R&D 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Disagreementt-1 0.296 0.846 -11.979 -0.056 -0.042 -0.105 -1.102 -1.572 -2.078 
 (0.023) (0.056) (-1.467) (-1.104) (-0.744) (-1.659) (-1.058) (-1.357) (-1.610) 
Log(Assets)  -4.572*** -1.605  -0.024 -0.077***  -0.462*** -0.391*** 
  (-2.920) (-1.605)  (-1.027) (-3.892)  (-5.333) (-3.113) 
Market-to-Book  -0.001 0.034  0.000 0.296**  0.032* 0.511* 
  (-0.858) (0.068)  (0.961) (2.592)  (1.869) (1.795) 
Cash Flow  -1.187 -5.156  0.101 12.621***  -0.099* -4.299* 
  (-1.076) (-1.288)  (1.000) (8.238)  (-2.045) (-1.828) 
Leverage  -28.239 -38.126  -0.115 0.845***  -2.053** -1.105 
  (-1.262) (-1.157)  (-0.993) (3.040)  (-2.110) (-1.421) 
Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 375,175 335,887 288,789 359,665 323,521 275,927 69,648 66,085 60,187 
R2 0.003 0.0031 0.0038 0.0016 0.0095 0.8971 0.0033 0.0037 0.0042 
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Table 10: Disagreement Orthogonalized with Respect to Number of Insiders 
Total investment (Panel A), Capex, Acquisitions, and R&D expenses (Panel B) are regressed on 
Orthogonalized Lagged Disagreement and controls. Lagged Disagreement is orthogonalized by 
regressing it against Number of Insiders and extracting the residuals from the regression. All 
specifications use Fama-French 49 industry by year fixed effects, and cluster standard errors by 
firm and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A 
 Dependent variable 
 Total investment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ortho. Disagreementt-1 -0.360 -0.262 -0.388 
 (-1.195) (-0.858) (-1.466) 
Log(Assets)  0.290*** 0.121** 
  (2.753) (2.287) 
Market-to-Book  -0.039 0.359*** 
  (-1.207) (3.971) 
Cash Flow  -34.683*** -5.991 
  (-3.804) (-1.130) 
Leverage  -1.096 0.867 
  (-1.149) (0.880) 
Controls No No Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 50,583 46,925 43,055 
R2 0.0369 0.2672 0.1298 
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Table 10 (Continued) 
Panel B 
 
 Dependent variable 
 Capex Acquisitions R&D 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Ortho. Disagreementt-1 -1.137* -1.064** -0.631 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.274 -0.033 0.097 
 (-1.956) (-2.315) (-1.433) (-1.156) (-1.263) (-1.371) (0.807) (-0.085) (0.244) 
Log(Assets)  -1.224*** -0.730***  0.002*** 0.002***  -0.325** -0.218** 
  (-6.754) (-3.977)  (7.035) (6.572)  (-2.688) (-2.769) 
Market-to-Book  0.359** 0.767***  0.000* 0.000*  -0.029 0.166 
  (2.603) (3.669)  (-1.806) (-1.754)  (-1.243) (1.602) 
Cash Flow  3.301 9.697  0.001* 0.021*  -7.110** -11.941 
  (1.125) (1.445)  (1.704) (1.708)  (-2.444) (-1.449) 
Leverage  -12.630*** -10.980***  0.033*** 0.050***  -0.574 0.385 
  (-11.906) (-8.859)  (4.791) (5.511)  (-0.420) (0.245) 
Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 50,420 46,790 43,052 48,289 44,937 41,221 14,511 13,863 13,341 
R2 0.0111 0.0698 0.0843 0.0502 0.0634 0.0777 0.0307 0.0426 0.0769 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Piety, Politics, and Portfolio Selection* 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine the impact of piety, a psychological trait that can influence economic 
behavior, on investor and corporate decision-making and performance. Turkey’s 
dominant religion is Islam, but investors and corporations present varying degrees of 
religiosity. Across 25,000 individual investors, we measure religiosity with choice of 
brokerage house, extent of holdings in an index of religiously-compliant firms, and 
voting patterns in the investor’s place of residence. Across almost 500 corporations 
listed on Istanbul’s stock exchange, we measure piety with inclusion in religiously-
compliant indexes, managerial membership of executive clubs (one secular, the other 
religious), use of Islamic financial instruments, and involvement with religious 
sponsorship activities. We characterize associations between investor religiosity and 
behavioral biases, associations between corporate religious and political positioning and 
performance, and the motivation and consequences of changes in corporate positioning. 
 
                                                          
* Orhan Erdem, PURI School of Business, Rockford University, Rockford, IL; Cagri Onuk, SC Johnson 
Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 
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 1. Introduction 
Exploring investor behavior is increasingly important in the finance literature. 
Even though conventional finance theory assumes that people act rationally, numerous 
experiments and empirical studies document biases in investor decisions. The biases 
uncovered in these studies are driven by psychological and belief-based factors. In 
particular, some studies demonstrate that certain religious attitudes have a substantial 
impact on economic decision-making.  
This paper studies the relationship between religious leanings and financial 
decisions of investors and the corporations they invest in. Using the unique economic, 
cultural, and political setting of the Republic of Turkey, we focus on “Islamic” investors 
among individuals participating in the Istanbul stock market. These investors are 
interesting for a number of reasons. In the last decade, financial institutions and products 
that operate by Islamic principles have become increasingly popular.9 In the wake of 
the global financial crisis, there is growing interest in Islamic financial institutions and 
products because their structure is believed to reduce default risk arising from weak 
economic conditions. At the same time, Islamic finance principles can impose 
constraints on investors and financial institutions. They can forbid interest-bearing bank 
accounts, conventional bonds, and ownership of shares in banks, which are often among 
the most liquid in developing economies. Thus, Islamic investors can be disadvantaged 
since they access fewer investment products than conventional investors.  
                                                          
9 For example, Standard & Poor’s Rating Services “Islamic Finance Outlook 2017” anticipates Islamic 
finance assets reaching $2.1 trillion by the end of 2016. A handful of Islamic finance courses of study 
have been developed at universities in western countries.  See, for example, 
http://www.masterstudies.com/MSc-Islamic-Finance/UK/DUBS/. 
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Turkey is an interesting setting for a study of investor behavior. The securities 
market lists hundreds of common stocks, market capitalization is about one-quarter 
trillion US dollars or almost one-third of GDP, and annual turnover is several times 
market capitalization. Attitudes toward religion as well as political orientation are likely 
to exert more influence on portfolio decisions than in typical developed countries. When 
the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, abbreviated “AKP”) 
came to power with the general election of 3rd November 2002, socially conservative 
people, who were historically excluded from many aspects of public activity, gained a 
stronger foothold in politics, economics, and finance. AKP has emphasized the 
conservative, religious values of its supporters, exacerbating the polarization of Turkish 
society in recent years. This was compounded by the policy record of its main 
competitor, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, abbreviated 
“CHP”), which historically excluded the socially conservative.  The divide between the 
supporters of these two parties correlates with the country’s geography.  Figure 1 shows 
voting patterns in 2011, with CHP votes concentrated around Istanbul and nearby 
coastal areas while AKP predominates in more conservative Anatolia. 
Thus, the Turkish population divides on observable religious, political, and 
geographic characteristics. Furthermore, the extent of these divisions can vary as the 
political power of the AKP has varied across recent elections. We hypothesize that both 
the psychological and social effects of religion influence individual investor decision 
making. We also predict that firms rearrange their alignment with political forces over 
time. With data from the Turkish stock market (Borsa Istanbul), we can measure 
differences in the investment decisions and performance of Islamic and conventional 
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investors. Thus, we can study the impact of piety, an important facet of psychology, on 
decision making. We can also study differences in apparent piety across the listed 
companies that Turkish investors choose from, and differences in performance and other 
operating characteristics of those companies. When combined with our understanding 
of Islamic and conventional portfolio selection, we can assess the costs of following 
Islamic investing principles and detect any clientele effects or catering by the listed 
companies. We also examine the effect of the social and political environment in Turkey 
on individual investors and corporations with event studies of decisive moments in the 
country's recent history. Aside from our primary goal of detecting behavioral biases 
related to religiosity in a novel setting, our work sheds light on the workings of Islamic 
finance and the costs and benefits of portfolio strategies such as so-called socially 
responsible investing.10 
 
2. Literature review and empirical predictions  
The interplay between economic decision making and characteristics like 
religiosity and political attitudes has been investigated in the economics and finance 
literatures from several aspects. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) report that 
religiosity is associated with good economic outcomes (higher GDP per capita and 
growth) but is also correlated with lower participation in the workforce by women. Stulz 
and Williamson (2003) report associations between religion and the legal rights of 
financial claimants. In particular, the predominant religion in a country is correlated 
with the nature and enforcement of creditor rights. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) 
                                                          
10 See, for example, Teoh, Welch, and Wazzan (1999). 
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document how language and culture influence the investment choices of individual 
investors in Finland, where individuals and corporate managers can be classified on 
their Finnish or Swedish language and culture. In contrast, Bhattacharya and Groznik 
(2008) find few associations between portfolio investment choices and the national 
origins of US immigrants. Morse and Shive (2011) find that patriotic sentiments are 
correlated with home bias in portfolios. Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) find that the 
extent to which mutual fund managers select socially responsible stocks is related to 
political preferences as expressed by political donations. Shu, Sulaeman, and Yeung 
(2012) find that mutual fund outcomes are related to the prevailing religious character 
of the headquarters region and the manager’s college. Gao, Wang, and Zhao (2017) 
report associations between local religiosity and the decisions and performance of hedge 
fund managers. 
There are only a few papers that consider how religion can influence the 
decisions of individual investors. Renneboog and Spaenjers (2012) show that religious 
households consider themselves more trusting, have a longer planning horizon, and have 
a higher propensity to save. Using an experimental survey from Germany, Noussair, 
Trautmann, van de Kuilen, and Vellekoop (2013) show that risk aversion of individuals 
increases with their degree of religiosity. These findings suggest that religion restrains 
risk-taking behavior. However, Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2011) find that the use of 
lotteries and investment in risky “lottery-type” stocks varies with religious 
characteristics of US states. Furthermore, Iannaccone (1998) reports that individuals 
with more education exhibit less religiosity.  If education in general correlates with 
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financial sophistication, it can subsume the apparently positive effect of religiosity on 
financial decision-making.  
There is a small but growing literature on associations between personal 
characteristics of corporate managers and corporate decision-making and performance.  
For example, Hutton, Jiang, and Kumar (2014) classify top managers of US 
corporations using public records of personal political donations. Firms headed by 
managers identified as Republicans typically have lower debt, less expenditure on 
capital, research, and development, and higher profits. A study of links between 
religiosity and corporate decision making, Hilary and Hui (2009), finds that US 
corporations located in US counties that score high on religiosity are associated with 
less risk-taking and more credible information releases as measured by stock market 
responses.  
We can also imagine reasons why religiosity can adversely affect investment 
performance. First, religious investors tend to avoid “sin stocks”, which can prevent 
them from maximizing return (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). Second, as Peifer (2013) 
asserts, religion can stimulate investor loyalty and increase willingness to hold a 
religiously-acceptable investment in spite of its poor performance.  
Given the goals of our work and the literature, we offer several predictions 
regarding what the data might reveal.  We begin with a simple null hypothesis: 
 
H0: There are no measurable differences in the behavior or performance of 
Islamic versus conventional investors. 
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Next, we expect to find higher risk-aversion among religious investors:11 
 
H1: Religious investors exhibit higher risk aversion in their trading behavior 
than conventional investors. 
 
A classic association between piety and risk-aversion is known as “Pascal’s wager” after 
the seventeenth century French philosopher who devised it. The idea is that the expected 
benefit from believing in a religion surpasses any harm since belief insures against 
eternal punishment in case God exists. More generally, religion can reflect a risk 
management strategy with which religious people find refuge from the uncertainties of 
life (Miller and Hoffman, 1995). Holloway (1979) shows that risk-averse people tend 
to use more traditional methods for dealing with uncertainty whereas risk takers seek 
more innovative methods. Thus, religion can be a traditional method for dealing with 
uncertainty, at least for the majority of its adherents. We also expect such risk-averse 
behavior in the investment decisions of religious people.12  
 A second, related hypothesis predicts “loyalty” in the stock holdings of religious 
investors relative to other investors: 
 
 H2: Religious investors display lower turnover of their stock holdings, 
particularly for stocks of apparently religious companies. 
 
                                                          
11 See Noussair, Trautmann, van de Kuilen, and Vellekoop (2012) for experimental work. 
12 There is evidence of this correlation in individual decisions regarding gambling (Diaz, 2000) and 
insurance (Halek and Eisenhauer, 2001). 
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A religious investor can be more optimistic about the prospects of apparently religious 
firms, underestimate its downside potential, and retain a position for a relatively long 
time. A religious investor can finance an apparently pious company even if it may not 
be economically advantageous. Given the presumed correlation between 
conservativeness and piety, we similarly predict that religious investors display more 
local bias (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001), prefer high dividend yield stocks (Graham 
and Kumar, 2006), avoid lottery-type stocks (Kumar, 2009), and display other biases 
that are consistent with a cautious or conservative style of decision-making. 
 We also offer competing predictions about associations between religiosity and 
individual investor performance: 
 
 H3a:  Religious investors display enhanced risk-adjusted performance relative 
to conventional investors because their conservative investment strategies avoid 
overconfidence and other aggressive and suboptimal investing styles. 
 
 H3b:  Religious investors experience inferior risk-adjusted performance because 
they limit the range of securities that are acceptable for their portfolios and take overly 
cautious decisions. 
 
Related to aggressive versus cautious investment styles, we also have a specific 
prediction about the extent to which different types of investors trade in what Kumar 
(2009) describes as “lottery-type stocks: 
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 H4: Religious investors avoid lottery-type stocks, and this contributes positively 
to their portfolio performance. 
 
Since gambling is prohibited in Islam, some among the pious will avoid gambling or 
investment vehicles that, in effect, emulate gambling. Thus, we predict less participation 
into lottery-type stocks among pious investors and less gambling-related portfolio 
underperformance. We detail below how we identify lottery-type stocks and 
characterize the extent to which a particular sample investor deals in them. These 
competing performance hypotheses parallel some established but conflicting facts in the 
empirical behavioral finance literature. Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2000) 
present evidence that aggressive trading strategies typically result in underperformance. 
On the other hand, Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2011) find that some conservative uses of 
mutual funds by older or local-biased investors can underperform. 
 We also offer competing predictions concerning the performance and behavior 
of Turkish corporations based on their apparent religiosity: 
 
H5a: Corporations that score high on religiosity enjoy superior valuation and 
performance as they are managed carefully. 
 
H5b: Corporations that score high on religiosity experience relatively weak 
valuation and performance since they cannot take full advantage of all investing 
and financing options. 
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Paralleling the individual investor literature, we can imagine that conservative values 
can either enhance or detract from corporate performance. 
 Finally, we consider how corporations respond to the characteristics of their 
investor clientele: 
 
H6: Corporations abuse the trust of religious investors by feigning religiosity 
and managing corporate assets and policies against the interests of outside 
shareholders. 
 
H6 hypothesizes a link between the religiosity of individual investors, their investment 
choices, and the choices and performances of listed companies.  
 An implication we will pursue eventually concerns the performance of new 
stock issues from the initial public offering price to the first day of trading.  Lowry and 
Shu (2002) describe and test implications of litigation risk for IPO returns.  In particular, 
an issuer can choose to set the IPO offer price relatively low to reduce both the potential 
loss that unhappy investors might sue and the probability of such lawsuits.  
 In the context of our setting and H6 in particular, we can imagine the following 
competing predictions. If apparently pious corporations are indeed more trustworthy 
than other issuers, there is less litigation risk, less underpricing of IPOs, lower IPO 
returns relative to IPOs of other issuers, and average longer-run post IPO returns.  We 
refer to this hypothesis as “trust anticipated”.  It also implies a relatively low number of 
investor lawsuits and government regulatory actions directed at the firm after the IPO. 
A variation on “trust anticipated” is “trust confirmed”: the IPO price is set low because 
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the market does not anticipate the good managerial behavior and performance of pious 
corporations and, thus, the IPO return is high, but longer-run post IPO returns are normal 
and the number of lawsuits and regulatory actions is low. If, on the other hand, 
apparently pious corporations abuse investors but are somewhat immune from legal and 
regulatory discipline, we predict “trust betrayed”: Investors bid aggressively for shares 
of apparently pious corporations, the IPO return is relatively high, but post IPO returns 
are poor, the number of lawsuits is high but they are unsuccessful in court, and the 
number of regulatory actions is low given government favoritism towards apparently 
pious firms. For all three predictions we expect relatively larger holdings by religious 
investors relative to other investors.    
 
3. Experimental design 
3.1 Data sources 
The key to our experiment is individual investor data recorded and stored by the 
Central Securities Depository Institution (MKK) of Borsa Istanbul, Turkey’s stock 
market. A random sample of approximately twenty-five thousand individual investors 
trading in the stock market includes daily trades from 2008 to 2012 plus other investor 
characteristics. Specifically, we have daily trades and positions from 2008 through 2012 
for 24,993 individual investors buying, selling, or holding shares of 417 Turkish firms 
listed on Borsa Istanbul. The stock exchange data also includes individual investor 
characteristics data such as age, gender, and city of residence. Stock price information 
on the listed firms comes from Datastream, or if unavailable, from Bloomberg.13 
                                                          
13 We screened the data for potential problems.  We found only a handful of cases where there is zero 
trading volume recorded for a particular price.  We found a slightly higher than expected (1/10) proportion 
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Furthermore, information on bank loan, bond, and equity financing of listed firms comes 
from Dealscan, Thomson One, and SDC. The bank loan and bond data allow us to 
characterize one dimension of the “Islamic-ness” of listed companies because each debt 
instrument’s data includes descriptive fields to suggest whether the style of the financing 
is conventional or Islamic. Other sources that we detail later are used to characterize 
other dimensions of corporate decision-making, performance, and religious and political 
positioning. Additional sources such as voting records are used to categorize each 
individual investor as “Islamic” or “conventional” using several alternative schemes. 
 
3.2 Construction of investor and corporate characteristics 
 Disposition effect is defined as an investor’s relative willingness to sell winners 
rather than losers (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998). A winning stock is one 
whose current price is higher than its purchase price. Similarly, a losing stock is one 
whose price is lower than its purchase price. Simply looking for the number of winning 
stocks the investor sells will not give us a reliable estimate of disposition effect if, for 
example, the stock market is in an upward trend. Therefore, we need to check the 
frequency with which an investor sells winners and losers relative to her opportunity to 
sell each. This leads us to the concept of paper gains and losses versus realized gains 
and losses (Odean, 1998). We observe a paper gain if a stock appreciates but an investor 
does not pocket the gain by selling the stock. In contrast, a realized gain occurs when 
                                                          
of prices in tenths of a lira rather than hundredths, which reflects the market’s price tick range 
(http://www.borsaistanbul.com/en/products-and-markets/markets/equity-market/price-bands). Our end-
of-day prices as reported by the exchange to Datastream and Bloomberg are either the last trade price or 
an official price-fixing. 
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the stock appreciates and an investor sells the stock. Similar definitions apply for paper 
and realized losses.  
We define the Proportion of Gains Realized (PGR) as realized gains divided by 
the sum of realized gains and paper gains. Similarly, the Proportion of Losses Realized 
(PLR) equals realized losses divided by the sum of realized losses and paper losses. 
PGR measures the propensity to realize a profit opportunity that arises while PLR 
measures the propensity to realize a loss. We then define the disposition effect as PGR 
minus PLR. Odean (1998) notes that, to compute the disposition effect, we can compare 
the current price to the average purchase price, the highest purchase price, the first 
purchase price, or the most recent purchase price. We use the most recent purchase 
price. 
Narrow framing is defined as an investor’s inability to frame her investment 
decisions broadly. It is shown in the psychology literature that people tend to consider 
each decision unique, often isolating the current choice from their other choices 
(Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; Kahneman, 2003). In financial investing, this 
corresponds to an investor making decisions separately from each other, thus ignoring 
the portfolio context. Narrow framing is implied by a lack of trade clustering (Kumar 
and Lim, 2008). Put another way, the more clustered in time an investor’s trades are, 
the more likely the investor thinks about the interaction between trades and her existing 
portfolio and hence the less narrowly framed are her trades. Trade clustering is an index 
between zero and one equal to one minus the ratio of the number of days an investor 
trades stock to the number of stock trades.  For example, if an investor makes only a 
single trade every trading day, the number of trades equals the number of trading days 
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and the trade clustering measure is zero, indicating this investor displays no clustering, 
that is, severe narrow framing. If another investor makes ten trades in different stocks 
every trading day, this second investor’s trade clustering measure is 0.9, indicating 
much lower narrow framing. As this investor makes multiple trades on different stocks 
every day, she presumably better calculates the interaction between her trades and her 
other holdings. 
Overconfidence. Overconfident investors overestimate the precision of their 
knowledge about the value of a security (Odean, 1998). Barber and Odean (2001) find 
that investors who trade frequently typically display poor performance. We follow 
Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2011) and define overconfident investors as those with the most 
frequent trading and the worst performance. In particular, an investor in the first quintile 
of trading frequency and the last quintile of return performance is categorized as 
overconfident. 
Gender. A number of papers have shown that men are more overconfident than 
women especially in stereotypically masculine domains such as knowledge of sports 
figures and politics (Deaux and Emswiller, 1974; Beyer and Bowden, 1997). A test of 
gender and overconfidence in investment decisions has been carried out by Barber and 
Odean (2001). Therefore, we use gender as an explanatory variable in our tests. 
Lottery stock preference. Kumar (2009) shows that the investment decisions 
of some people resemble their lottery purchases. Furthermore, he describes 
socioeconomic factors that induce both greater expenditure on lotteries and greater 
investment in lottery-type stocks.  Kumar (2009) identifies lottery-type stocks based on 
three characteristics. First, lottery tickets can be bought quite cheaply so lottery-type 
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stocks should have low nominal prices. Second, lottery holders hit the jackpot with a 
miniscule probability, so lottery-type stocks should have outsized returns with a very 
low probability. Stocks with a history of a few large positive return outliers will display 
high idiosyncratic skewness. Third, a lottery-type stock should have high idiosyncratic 
volatility. A stock that has yielded a very large return in the past but that normally has 
little variation in returns might appear to investors as unlikely to repeat its past bounty. 
For its large returns in the past to appear replicable to investors, it should have high 
idiosyncratic volatility.  Following Kumar (2009), we define idiosyncratic volatility as 
the standard deviation of the residual from a Fama-French four-factor model 
implemented with market, SMB, HML, and WML factors local to Borsa Istanbul. 
Idiosyncratic skewness is defined as the skewness of the residual obtained by fitting a 
two-factor model with market return and squared market return terms. At the end of 
month 𝑡, both idiosyncratic volatility and skewness are computed using the previous 6 
months of daily data. A lottery-type stock has below median price and above median 
idiosyncratic volatility and idiosyncratic skewness in a given month. Lottery-stock 
preference is then a measure of an investor’s appetite for lottery-type stocks in her 
aggregate holdings. Specifically, we compute the ratio of the value of lottery-type stocks 
in an investor’s portfolio to the value of the entire portfolio at the end of a given month. 
We then set lottery-stock preference for a given investor to the median of that ratio over 
all months that the investor is in the sample.   
Local bias. Previous authors show that some investors tend to invest in 
companies that are geographically close to them, perhaps due to familiarity or an 
informational advantage. For each investor and month, we identify whether each 
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company in the investor’s portfolio is headquartered in the city of residence of the 
investor. We then compare the share of such local companies the investor holds in her 
portfolio to the actual share of companies from the investor’s city. The difference is our 
measure of local bias14. For a robustness check, we exclude the city of Istanbul from 
local bias calculations as more than half the companies in Borsa Istanbul are 
headquartered there. These companies usually have operations nationwide so investors 
in these companies may be less locally-minded. 
Individual investor religiosity. To label an individual investor as “Islamic” or 
“conventional”, we use five alternative approaches. First, we have proprietary data on 
individual investor codes that indicate whether each transaction is executed through 
Turkey’s only Islamic-oriented brokerage house, Bizim Securities. Since 
“participation” (that is, Islamic) banks use this broker exclusively and other banks avoid 
it, one measure of whether an investor can be thought of as Islamic is a dummy variable 
set to one for investors who use this particular brokerage house and zero otherwise.  
Second, we make use of the Katilim (Participation) 50 index and measure the 
extent to which each investor holds index component stocks. The Katilim index consists 
of listed Turkish firms that are deemed compliant with Islamic ways of doing 
commerce.15 For one categorization, we label an investor Islamic if every trade of that 
investor is in a firm on the Katilim 50 index. As an alternative categorization, we label 
an investor Islamic if his average percent holding of Katilim 50 components is more 
                                                          
14 An alternative local bias measure computed in terms of portfolio holdings of local companies has a 
highly significant correlation coefficient of 0.86 with our measure. We prefer our measure because, in a 
sense, we are measuring “attention to politically correct stocks”. It can be signaled quite readily by the 
number of names the investor tracks, rather than the literal percentage of the portfolio. 
15 See Appendix A for details of the Katilim index. 
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than two standard deviations above the average for all investors. For a sense of the 
popularity of Katilim 50 index stocks among our sample investors, the mean (median) 
percentage of Katilim 50 index stock holdings to total holdings is 14.6% (2.9%) with a 
standard deviation of 23.6%. 
 Third, we infer the likely political leanings of each investor using the city-level16 
vote share for the ruling conservative AKP (Justice and Development Party) in the 2011 
general election. Political preference is a good proxy for piety in Turkey. AKP has 
always branded itself as conservative, where in the context of Turkey, conservatism is 
usually defined in social- religious terms. For example, the party has fought to permit 
the wearing of headscarves by women, an Islamic symbol, in universities during a 2008 
action in Turkey’s Constitutional Court. Using records of general election votes, we sort 
cities based on their vote share for AKP. We compute two categorizations.  Our first 
scheme labels an investor religious if she is from a city that has a higher percentage vote 
for AKP than Istanbul.17 Our second scheme labels an investor as religious if she lives 
in a city which has a higher percentage AKP vote share than the 90th percentile city, 
Ordu. A secular investor then lives in a city with a lower percentage AKP vote share 
than the 10th percentile city, Izmir. Unfortunately, this political leaning approach cannot 
capture differences in piety within cities. 
 The last two measures for individual investor piety are also city-based. One of 
them is the city-by-city religiosity survey results by KONDA Research and 
                                                          
16 In Turkey, “city” usually refers to a province so it encompasses rural areas that surround the urban 
center plus  smaller towns. Given the electoral process in Turkey, this also coincides with an “electoral 
district”. 
17 Istanbul is not the median city in terms of AKP vote share but it is close: 36 cities have lower AKP 
vote shares and 44 cities have higher AKP vote shares. Furthermore, there are so many investors from 
Istanbul that, when investors are sorted by their city’s AKP vote share, Istanbul’s AKP vote share 
becomes the median. 
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Consultancy. KONDA is a popular Turkish public opinion polling company. They were 
the most accurate in predicting the outcome of the June 2015 general elections results.18 
We have a survey-based sample from 2010 to 2015 that partially overlaps with our 
individual investor trading sample. The poll consists of asking people their involvement 
with religion that they express from a scale of 1 (non-believer) to 4 (devout). These 
scores are averaged for each city and year. The last individual investor religiosity proxy, 
Pupils, measures the number of young pupils attending Quranic schools per thousand 
people. The numbers are aggregated at a city per year basis. By utilizing variables of 
political (AKP) and religious (KONDA and Pupils) nature, we attempt to distinguish 
between the effect of these two strong forces in individuals’ portfolio decisions. 
Corporate religiosity. To label a listed corporation as “Islamic” or 
“conventional”, we use several alternative approaches. First, we study each listed firm’s 
balance sheet for evidence that the firm employs any Islamic bank loans or bond issues. 
Sources of this data are the descriptions in SDC, Thomson One, and Dealscan. We find 
eleven publicly listed firms that use Islamic financing.19 Second, we judge each listed 
company’s religiosity and political positioning with the conservative AKP voting share 
in its headquarters city. Third, we categorize each listed corporation based on the social 
connections of its CEO.  Specifically, there are two competing clubs for top corporate 
                                                          
18 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KONDA_Research_and_Consultancy 
19 Two are Islamic banks, Bank Asya and Albaraka Turk. The other two Islamic banks in Turkey are 
privately owned. There are three non-financial institutions: Boyner (surprising because chairman, Cem 
Boyner, is an outspoken critic of AKP leader Erdogan), Ulker (expected, as the founding family is 
regarded as conservative), and  Turkcell (a large telecoms firm that in recent years took in former 
members of AKP to its board: https://www.turkcell.com.tr/en/aboutus/investor-relations/corporate-
governance). There are also six non-Islamic financial institutions: Is REIT, Is Leasing (considered secular 
because it was founded by Ataturk and the secular opposition party, CHP, has a large stake), TSKB 
(oldest Turkish development bank), Finans Leasing (part of Finans Bank founded by a secular banker), 
and Yapi Kredi Bank (owned by the Koc Family and Italian investors). 
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managers in Turkey. The Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association 
(TUSIAD) is traditionally aligned with secular thought and politicians while the 
Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD) is associated 
with conservative views and the AKP. Fourth, we identify any religious sponsorship 
activity that Turkish firms are involved in. Such activities can range from sponsoring a 
religious charity to organizing a Ramadan dinner. 
 
3.3. Empirical specifications 
We employ our data with fairly standard tests based on summary statistics or 
regressions. For some experiments, we will conduct event studies around firm specific, 
political, and macroeconomic events. As stated above, we will study the first use of 
Islamic style financing or the change in CEO political leaning as signaled by 
membership in one of the executive clubs. We will also examine the timing, frequency, 
and performance of initial public offerings of pious versus secular corporations. 
 Furthermore, while we view much of our work as exploratory and descriptive, 
it will be useful for us to state and implement a more formal identification strategy. 
Therefore, some of our tests will be centered on events which can support difference-
in-difference analysis or other approaches to defining an identification strategy. These 
events should have implications for the strength of our empirical predictions yet should 
be exogenous, that is, should not have been designed to manipulate the individual 
investor and corporate decisions and characteristics that we study.  
The first influential event we use is the Gaza flotilla raid that took place on 31 
May 2010. Similar to the political situation today, the city of Gaza was at the time under 
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the blockade of Israeli authorities. A small fleet of civilian ships from Turkey tried to 
reach Gaza to annul the blockade. However, Israeli navy attacked the ships slightly 
outside of Israeli waters to prevent the de facto voiding of the blockade. The 
confrontation between the Turks and Israelis stirred religious sentiment in Turkey where 
there is a strong pro-Palestinian sentiment due to common religious and historical ties. 
We test whether the event incited religious and conservative investors in Turkey and 
made them increase their portfolio holdings of conservative firms. As a second event, 
we use one of the pivotal points in the Arab Spring. The popular uprisings started in 
Tunisia in December 2010 with the self-immolation of a street vendor who protested 
poverty and government oppression. An important impetus came in the following month 
when the incumbent Tunisian government stepped down and the revolts became 
international as the Egyptian people started protesting the Mubarak government. Hence, 
we use January 2011 as a pivotal moment in Arab Spring. It seems likely that these 
events increased the prospects and likely tenure of the AKP government in Turkey as 
various Middle Eastern nations aspired to have democratic yet Islamic governments of 
their own. We test whether religious investors in Turkey increased their allocation to 
conservative firms after Arab Spring promised large-scale change for the political fabric 
of the Middle East and validated the effectiveness of AKP’s democratic and moderately 
Islamist model. In general, political events that strengthen or weaken the appeal of the 
AKP for voters, investors, and corporations can affect the strength of the relationships 
outlined in our testable hypotheses. As other potential examples, the AKP electoral 
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victory of 12 June 2011 and the resignation of key military leaders on 29 July 2011 
increased the credibility and likely tenure of the AKP government.20  
  
4.  Results 
4.1 Summary statistics 
The majority of our investors are male (75.8%). The average age of investors is 
46.0. The average female investor is about 2 years older than the average male investor. 
The mean (median) daily return of investors is 0.026% (0.044%) with a standard 
deviation of 0.168%. The annualized values for the mean (median) are roughly 6.52% 
(11.07%). 
Table 1 displays correlations between each pair of behavioral bias proxies. In 
each cell of the table, the top number is the correlation coefficient and the bottom 
number is the p-value. All six proxies and age are typically significantly pairwise 
correlated with each other. For example, echoing earlier work in the behavioral finance 
literature, the gender dummy (indicating a male investor) is significantly correlated with 
the overconfidence dummy. Interestingly, with age, investors tend to become less prone 
to behavioral biases except narrow framing (that is, less clustering) and local bias. 
 Next, we summarize the bias proxies for Islamic and conventional investors 
separately. Table 2 categorizes investors as Islamic or conventional based on use of an 
account at an Islamic-oriented brokerage house. Comparing the two types of investors, 
we see that overconfidence, disposition effect, narrow framing (that is, less trade 
                                                          
20 Recent events such as the Gezi Park protests (27 May 2013), and the onset of corruption allegations 
against key AKP figures (13 December 2013) reduced the credibility and likely tenure of the AKP 
government. However, these events occur beyond the end of the sample period for which we have data. 
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clustering), and lottery-stock preference are lower for Islamic investors whereas local 
bias is higher. Differences in overconfidence and narrow framing across the two types 
are quite strong and statistically significant at the 1% level while the difference for 
disposition effect is only marginally significant. Differences in lottery-stock preference 
and local bias are not statistically significant. There is a significantly higher proportion 
of male investors among those categorized as Islamic. Islamic investors are about 1.5 
years younger on average than others, and this difference is strongly statistically 
significant. Although daily portfolio returns of Islamic investors are about one basis 
point per month higher than those of other investors, the difference is not statistically 
significant. For both categories of investors, daily portfolio returns are significantly 
positive. The two right-hand columns of the table report alternative matching-based 
tests of the significance of the difference between Islamic and Conventional investors.  
The inferences are typically similar to those from the conventional significance test. 
Table 3 reports similar summary statistics in which investors are classified based 
on their holdings of Katilim 50 index component stocks. Specifically, an investor is 
classified as Islamic if her entire holdings are composed solely of Katilim 50 index 
component stocks. The signs of relationships are the same as in Table 2 except for 
narrow framing: Islamic investors now have higher narrow framing (that is, less trade 
clustering). This can be explained by the identification of those investors who only deal 
with the fifty Katilim index component stocks.  This relatively small number of stocks 
may allow these investors to follow each individually, but at the cost of portfolio 
diversification. Interestingly, the investors who follow the “Katilim 50 only” strategy 
are proportionally more female and about four years older than other investors. 
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Furthermore, there is now a statistically significant difference in average daily portfolio 
returns across the two investor groups. The “Katilim 50 only” investors underperform 
relative to other investors, and their returns are not statistically different from zero21. 
Overall, the differences appear more statistically significant when Islamic versus 
conventional is measured with actual holdings (Table 3) rather than keeping a brokerage 
account at Turkey’s sole Islamic brokerage firm (Table 2).  
Table 4 reports similar tests for which Islamic versus conventional is identified 
using city-level AKP vote shares. We first briefly summarize city-level vote shares. 
Across 81 cities, AKP wins, on average, slightly more than half the votes, 50.85%.  This 
is a large number given that Turkish politics are not dominated by only two major 
parties. However, there is a good deal of dispersion in AKP voting share across cities, 
with a standard deviation of 13.19%, a minimum of only 15.75%, and a maximum of 
69.63%. This sizeable variation in AKP vote share across cities suggests substantial 
differences in political leaning and piety across cities. 
As explained previously, Table 4 uses two classification schemes, one based on 
cities above versus below median city-level AKP vote share and another comparing top 
decile AKP voting share cities to bottom decile cities. Both schemes find statistically 
significant differences in Islamic and other investors in the gender dummy, local bias, 
and age characteristics. Cities with higher AKP vote share have a proportionally more 
male investor base. Similar to the previous two categorizations, Islamic investors 
                                                          
21 The number of Islamic investors identified by “Katilim 50 only” strategy is relatively low (480). In 
untabulated results, we also consider investors whose percent Katilim 50 index component stock holdings 
are two standard deviations or more above the sample average. Results are essentially unchanged from 
Table 3, except Islamic investors’ daily returns turn significantly positive and statistically 
indistinguishable from the daily returns of conventional investors. 
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display higher local bias. Put another way, in cities that vote heavily for AKP, investors 
typically favor the local firms more than other investors do. Similar to the brokerage 
house categorization (Table 2), Islamic investors are typically a few years younger than 
other investors. It may be the case that stock market participation is a relatively recent 
phenomenon among religious people, with early adopters being a bit younger. Note that, 
for this table, we are unable to offer the alternative matching-based tests because all 
residents of a particular city are classified identically so no matching is possible within 
city. 
Next, we examine monthly portfolio performance of Islamic versus 
conventional investors in greater detail with cross sectional averages of raw returns, 
Sharpe ratios, single factor alpha, and Fama-French 4-factor alpha. Both alphas are 
computed with local stock market factors. In Table 5, “conventional” investors are 
defined as those that are not classified as Islamic by any of our three categorization 
schemes. There do not appear to be a consistent systematic difference between the mean 
raw monthly portfolio returns of Islamic and conventional investors. Although the 
performance of Islamic investors identified through holdings of Katilim index 
components seems relatively low, the performance of Islamic investors identified using 
the other two characterization schemes is statistically indistinguishable from the 
performance of conventional investors. These findings suggest that the performance of 
Katilim component stocks is relatively weak, an issue we will eventually address in the 
context of testable prediction H6. 
Table 5 presents similar findings for performance measured with Sharpe ratios 
and alphas. Interestingly, the average Sharpe ratio of Katilim Index investors is not only 
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lower than that of conventional investors but it is also negative, indicating poor 
performance in an absolute sense. However, monthly alphas suggest that the 
performance of Katilim Index focused investors is not distinguishable from that of 
Islamic investors identified by other characterization schemes. This suggests that 
Katilim stocks have relatively low loadings on market wide systematic risk factors. Put 
another way, Katilim component stocks may be less risky in several dimensions. 
Nonetheless, Islamic investors identified by brokerage house display the lowest alphas 
from both one- and four-factor models. Intriguingly, four-factor alphas of every investor 
group, Islamic and conventional, are negative. This suggests that Turkish retail investors 
are typically unable to assess systematic risk versus return regardless of their degree of 
piety. 
 
4.2 Individual investor piety and behavioral biases 
Next, we assess the effect of piety on each behavioral bias while simultaneously 
accounting for controls such as investor age, gender, city of residence, wealth, and stock 
market experience. Our proxy for investor wealth is median total portfolio value over 
the sample period. Our proxy for stock market experience is the number of days from 
opening a brokerage account until the beginning of 2008, the start of our sample trading 
period. In Tables 6 through 8, each column corresponds to one of our three proxies for 
piety. 
Table 6 studies overconfidence and confirms that pious investors are typically 
less overconfident. Furthermore, age and stock market experience attenuate 
overconfidence. Men are more overconfident than women, supporting Barber and 
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Odean (2001) and confirming their results for the Turkish stock market. Wealthier 
investors seem less affected by overconfidence. 
Table 7 studies lottery-stock preference. The sign of the association with piety 
varies with the piety measure. Specifically, it is positive with AKP vote share, 
suggesting that the proportion of lottery-type stocks in an investor’s portfolio is larger 
in areas where the religious conservative party is particularly popular. It is possible that 
this reflects heterogeneity in the population of Islamic investors if, for example, Islamic 
investors from Anatolia (captured by the AKP vote share proxy) like gambling in the 
stock market, while those from Istanbul (ignored by the AKP vote share proxy) avoid 
gambling behavior even in the stock market. In line with such a conjecture, the sign of 
the relationship between piety and lottery stock preference reverses for other 
categorizations of investors. Age and stock market experience are found to reduce 
investment in lottery-type stocks, while men have a tendency to overinvest in such 
stocks. 
Table 8 studies local bias. Panel A includes all investors while Panel B excludes 
investors from Istanbul (the residence of most of our sample of investors) for a 
robustness check. Furthermore, as suggested earlier, firms headquartered in Istanbul 
often operate nationwide and may not be perceived as local in Istanbul or anywhere. 
Both panels of Table 8 indicate a positive relationship between piety and local bias. The 
relationship is particularly strong for the AKP vote share piety proxy, which implies 
that pious investors from Anatolia have even higher local bias. Older investors also 
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display relatively more local bias while more experienced investors are more likely to 
diversify geographically22. 
To summarize associations between measures of religiosity and other individual 
investor characteristics, Table 9 presents the results of factor analysis that show how 
certain characteristics tend to coincide in individual investors. Across brokerage 
account, Katilim holdings, and AKP vote share proxies for religiosity, some common 
patterns emerge.  For each factor, we offer a label to summarize the nature of the factor. 
The first factor represents an investor who trades too frequently (overconfidence) and 
sells winners too quickly (disposition effect). We label this investor “Impatient”.  
Impatient tends to be young and is less likely to be religious. The second factor 
represents an investor who is older, experienced with stocks, is less likely to suffer 
behavioral biases, and is less likely to be religious.  We label this investor 
“Experienced”. The third factor represents an investor who is likely to be religious, has 
a relatively large brokerage account, avoids most behavior biases, but suffers local bias 
perhaps due to his or her conservative nature. We label this investor "Pious". Finally, 
the fourth factor represents an investor who is young, likely male and is not afraid to 
invest far from home. We label this investor “Gambler” because of a strong preference 
for lottery type stocks. The patterns are sensible, broadly consistent with the findings of 
other papers that study US data, and, in particular, highlight the associations between 
religiosity and conservative decision-making. 
Table 10 presents results of regressing portfolio outcomes, both performance-
based and religious, on individual characteristics. Especially noteworthy are 
                                                          
22 Regarding other behavioral biases, in untabulated results, we find that piety has a negative effect on 
disposition bias. Findings on trade clustering are inconclusive. 
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characteristics related to individual investor piety. In addition to the AKP-based 
measure, we use two other measures based on the city the investor is coming from: (i) 
KONDA, a survey-based measure of piety and (ii) Pupils, which measure the number 
of pupils attending religious schools in the investor’s city. We complement the AKP-
based measure in order to distinguish between the effect of religious and political 
affiliations in determining individual portfolio outcomes. We also account for the fact 
that many of our estimated individual characteristics have errors by conducting an 
errors-in-variables estimation. Particularly, except for the variables Age, Gender, and 
Stock Market Experience, which are measured accurately, we allow for errors in other 
characteristics. We allow for errors by letting the reliability of explanatory variables, 
which is defined as 1 −
𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
 to be less than one. We only show regressions 
with reliability one, which correspond to no errors, and reliability 0.8 for brevity. We 
check for any difference in coefficients on AKP, KONDA, and Pupils. Coefficients on 
AKP and Pupils generate the largest difference hinting at differences between how 
religion and politics determine portfolio outcomes. When errors in characteristics are 
accounted for, the differences usually get attenuated but sometimes remain statistically 
significant. 
 
4.3 Corporate piety 
Next, we compare the characteristics of secular and apparently religious firms. 
Table 11 summarizes corporate characteristics where perceived corporate piety is 
characterized by the CEO’s membership of secular (TUSIAD) or conservative 
(MUSIAD) business organizations. This is a meaningful measure of political and social 
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orientation as each firm consciously chooses whether to align with overtly secular or 
conservative organizations. We determine membership of TUSIAD from an annual 
publicly available list. 23  We determine membership of MUSIAD from online searches 
for hints of an association displayed in news stories, company or MUSIAD reports, and 
similar sources. While some memberships are explicitly stated, others are more tacit, as 
in the case of a company manager leading a MUSIAD panel. The numbers in brackets 
in the table indicate the number of observations that fall into each category.  It is evident 
that there are many observations in both secular and conservative categories, but many 
listed firms are not associated with either club. 24 
Reading across the columns, there are many substantial differences in comparing 
secular (TUSIAD member) firms, conservative (MUSIAD member) firms, and those 
that are not associated with either club. Measured by the book value of total assets, 
secular firms are significantly larger than conservative firms, and both types of firms 
are several times larger than firms that are not associated with either group. Sales and 
market capitalization are larger for conservative firms than for secular firms. However, 
book measures of profitability are significantly higher for secular firms. Book asset 
growth is significantly greater for conservative firms. Price-earnings ratios are typically 
highest for conservative firms. Thus, it appears that members of the conservative 
MUSIAD group are expanding their investments rapidly and, based on price-earnings 
ratios, the stock market believes these firms are expected to produce growing profits. 
                                                          
23 TUSIAD lists its entire membership in its annual report (http://www.tusiad.org.tr/bilgi-merkezi/tusiad-
faaliyet-raporlari/ ). 
24 A handful of firms appear to maintain membership in both groups. They are included in the medians 
for all groups but are placed in the MUSIAD conservative group for the purpose of difference-in-medians 
tests. 
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However, average raw and risk-adjusted excess returns are not distinguishable by 
TUSIAD versus MUSIAD membership. 
A second characterization of firm piety is based on sponsorship activities. These 
activities range from sponsoring a sports club to organizing a community dinner. 
Sponsorship activities are uncovered through Google searches and these activities are 
characterized as either secular or conservative. Activities deemed conservative are 
either religious in nature or linked to the conservative AKP government. Examples to 
such conservative activities include sponsoring a religious foundation, sponsoring a 
religious event such as a Ramadan dinner, or sponsoring a conference organized by a 
government ministry. 
Unlike the characterization by executive club affiliation, sponsorship activities 
do not give us a time-series for conservative versus secular positioning. A single 
conservative sponsorship is enough for us to label the firm as conservative throughout 
our sample period. That’s why, in Table 12, each observation is a firm not a firm-
quarter. Conservative firms are compared to firms that only sponsor secular activities. 
As another specification we also compare conservative firms to firms that are not found 
to be involved with conservative activities. However, this second set of firms also 
include firms without any observable sponsorship activities and are likely to be smaller. 
Making comparisons along the same lines as in Table 11, conservative firms are found 
to have higher asset growth than secular firms which supports our previous results. 
Nevertheless, shares of conservative firms have lower 4-factor alphas indicating that 
secular firms can be a better investment opportunity for investors despite these firms 
not displaying growth characteristics. 
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4.4. Interactions between individual and corporate piety 
 As a first attempt to show interactions between individual and corporate piety, 
Table 13 displays results of a difference-in-differences specification around two 
influential events that plausibly affected people’s perceptions regarding the prospects 
of religiously oriented firms. As mentioned earlier, the first event is the Gaza flotilla 
raid that took place on May 31, 2010. The confrontation between Turkey and Israel 
stirred religious sentiment in the former country. An interesting question is whether we 
can observe religious investors preferring apparently religious firms more than they 
normally do after the event. To test this conjecture, we run the following diff-in-diff 
setup: 
 
𝑀𝑈𝑆𝐼𝐴𝐷 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐾𝑂𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐾𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗ 𝐾𝑂𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐾𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
 The dependent variable measures the proportion of an investor’s holdings in 
MUSIAD, that is, conservative firms. Essentially, we are testing whether investors hold 
more of conservative firm stock after the flotilla raid. Event is one for the twelve months 
following the flotilla raid and is zero for the twelve months prior to the raid. There are 
three city-based variables that stand for investor conservatism. First one is KONDA, 
which is a survey-based measure of piety in an investor’s city. The second one is the 
 92 
 
AKP vote share in an investor’s city. The third one is the number of pupils attending 
religious schools per population. The main goal in having multiple measures of 
conservatism is to separate the effects of investors’ piety and political orientation. Even 
though AKP brands itself as socially conservative and pious, it is important and 
interesting to split the effects of religion and politics to the extent possible. The 
coefficients of interest are 𝛽5−7, which would indicate whether conservative investors 
shift their holdings of apparently religious firms following the flotilla raid. 
 Specification 1 in Table 13 shows that the interactive term associated with AKP 
vote share is positive while that associated with Pupils is negative where both results 
are statistically significant. It appears that while the confrontation between Turkey and 
Israel stirred religious sentiment in the country, it was mostly politically conservative 
people that oriented themselves with conservative firms following the event. 
Corroborating evidence is shown in specification 2 where the event is the change in 
government in Tunisia and start of popular uprisings against the Mubarak regime in 
Egypt in January 2011 as part of Arab Spring. The examination of interactive terms 
gives the same inference in which it is the politically conservative investor that orients 
herself with conservative firms after events that change the prospects for apparently 
religious firms. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
Our findings thus far suggest that Islamic investors are less prone to 
overconfidence and disposition effect, and more prone to local bias. There is mixed 
evidence on narrow framing, lottery-stock preference and gender, although the bulk of 
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the evidence suggests that Islamic investors have higher narrow framing, lower lottery-
stock preference, and are more likely to be male. There is no clear evidence on whether 
individual portfolio returns are higher or lower for Islamic investors, although there is 
a weak evidence that monthly alpha is higher for conventional investors. 
Comparisons of firms based on religiosity produce substantially different results 
depending on the method of identifying pious versus other firms. Firms with Islamic 
financing on their balance sheets tend to be large while firms headquartered in more 
electorally religious cities tend to be small. When categorized based on the fraction of 
votes going to the conservative AKP, the headquarters city findings suggest that 
apparently religious firms enjoy higher valuation due to investor loyalty. Perhaps most 
interesting is the categorization based on CEO membership of executive clubs TUSIAD 
and MUSIAD.  In contrast to trying to infer corporate piety from the balance sheet or 
the conservative vote share in the headquarters city, membership of these clubs is an 
explicit political and religious positioning selected by each firm. It appears that the 
conservative club members grow their assets more aggressively, use those assets less 
profitably, and trade in the stock market as growth stocks. This is a result that is 
corroborated with findings on firms involved with sponsorships of religious nature. 
Preliminary results on the interaction and feedback between religious investors 
and firms demonstrate that such investors adjust their allegiance to religious firms after 
momentous events that stir up conservative sentiment. Particularly, it is the politically 
conservative investor that increases her holdings of conservative firms upon such 
events. The fact that religious investors do not respond as much can be taken as 
suggestive evidence that investors are not necessarily increasing their religious loyalty. 
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Instead, they are increasing their holdings in anticipation of a more favorable business 
environment for conservative firms. 
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Table 1. Cross correlations of behavioral bias proxies 
 
This table shows pairwise correlations for the six behavioral bias proxies as well as age.  Each cell contains the correlation coefficient 
with its p-value beneath. Disposition, Clustering, Lottery, and Local are disposition effect, trade clustering, lottery-stock preference, and 
local bias respectively. Higher trade clustering indicates lower narrow framing bias. The sample contains 24,996 investors. Missing 
values reduce the number of observations for some cells. ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. 
 
 Overconfidence Disposition Clustering Gender Lottery Local 
Disposition 0.222***      
 (0.000)      
Clustering 0.155*** 0.197***     
 (0.000) (0.000)     
Gender 0.068*** 0.030*** 0.086***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Lottery 0.042*** 0.016** 0.002 0.036***   
 (0.000) (0.034) (0.742) (0.000)   
Local -0.005 -0.012 -0.043*** -0.002 0.002  
 (0.432) (0.136) (0.000) (0.736) (0.734)  
Age -0.103*** -0.058*** -0.100*** -0.069*** -0.084*** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.877) 
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Table 2. Summary statistics on investor characteristics and daily portfolio performance with individuals categorized by use of 
Islamic brokerage firm 
 
Investors are classified as “Islamic” or “Conventional” depending on account kept at an Islamic brokerage house. Disposition, Clustering, 
Lottery, and Local are disposition effect, trade clustering, lottery-stock preference, and local bias respectively. Higher trade clustering 
indicates lower narrow framing bias. The first p-test tests whether the difference in mean of Islamic versus other investors is statistically 
significant. The second and third p-tests are alternative tests of the difference or distance between Islamic and other investors. Propensity 
score matching is based on a logit regression and reduces characteristics to a single-dimensional score. Mahalanobis distance is a multi-
dimensional “nearest neighbor” method which is non parametric and allows perfect matching on discrete characteristics. 
 
    
z-test for difference between treated 
and control groups 
  
 Mean Observations 
p-test difference 
in means 
Propensity score 
matched 
Mahalanobis 
distance 
Islamic Investors      
Overconfidence 0.045 665 0.007 -1.888 -2.602 
Disposition 0.030 614 0.052 -2.582 -1.500 
Clustering 0.342 665 0.000 3.940 3.427 
Gender 0.866 665 0.000   
Lottery 0.033 665 0.163 -1.471 -0.887 
Local 0.063 571 0.351 1.582 0.247 
Age 44.486 665 0.001   
Daily return 0.00035 665 0.146 0.694 0.389 
Conventional Investors      
Overconfidence 0.073 24,302    
Disposition 0.036 17,131    
Clustering 0.282 24,282    
Gender 0.755 24,331    
Lottery 0.042 24,281    
Local 0.053 21,125    
Age 46.037 24,331    
Daily return 0.00026 24,302    
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Table 3. Summary statistics on investor characteristics and daily portfolio performance with individuals categorized by 
exclusive holdings of component stocks of an Islamic-compliant index 
 
Investors are classified as “Islamic” rather than “Conventional” if all holdings are component shares of the Katilim 50 index of Islamic-compliant 
companies. Disposition, Clustering, Lottery, and Local are disposition effect, trade clustering, lottery-stock preference, and local bias respectively. 
Higher trade clustering indicates lower narrow framing bias. The first p-test tests whether the difference in mean of Islamic versus other investors is 
statistically significant. The second and third p-tests are alternative tests of the difference or distance between Islamic and other investors. Propensity 
score matching is based on a logit regression and reduces characteristics to a single-dimensional score. Mahalanobis distance is a multi-dimensional 
“nearest neighbor” method which is non parametric and allows perfect matching on discrete characteristics. 
 
 Mean Observations 
p-test difference 
in means 
z-test for difference between 
treated and control groups 
  
Propensity 
score matched 
Mahalanobis 
distance 
Islamic Investors  
  
Overconfidence 0.029 480 less than 0.001 -3.214 -3.264 
Disposition 0.011 116 less than 0.001 -3.106 -5.372 
Clustering 0.025 480 less than 0.001 -19.227 -18.403 
Gender 0.688 480 less than 0.001   
Lottery 0.019 480 less than 0.001 -2.025 -1.738 
Local 0.130 427 less than 0.001 3.034 3.182 
Age 49.681 480 less than 0.001   
Daily return 0.00003 480 less than 0.001 -1.633 -1.108 
Conventional Investors  
  
Overconfidence 0.073 24487  
  
Disposition 0.036 17629  
  
Clustering 0.288 24467  
  
Gender 0.759 24516  
  
Lottery 0.042 24466  
  
Local 0.049 21269  
  
Age 45.923 24516  
  
Daily return 0.00027 24487  
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Table 4. Summary statistics on investor characteristics and daily portfolio performance with individuals categorized by AKP 
vote share of city of residence 
Investors are classified as “Islamic” (“Conventional”) if living in cities with above (below) median or top (bottom) decile AKP vote 
share. Disposition, Clustering, Lottery, and Local are disposition effect, trade clustering, lottery-stock preference, and local bias 
respectively. Higher trade clustering indicates lower narrow framing bias. The p-test tests whether the difference in mean of Islamic 
versus other investors is statistically significant.  We do not include the alternative propensity score and Mahalanobis distance test because 
all residents of a particular city are classified identically on religiosity so that no within-city comparisons of religious and secular are 
possible.   
 Islamic Conventional p-test difference in means 
 Mean Observations Mean Observations  
Median cutoff      
Overconfidence 0.074 5,548 0.076 10,756 0.622 
Disposition 0.035 4,025 0.037 7,560 0.065 
Clustering 0.281 5,545 0.276 10,746 0.208 
Gender 0.826 5,556 0.762 10,768 less than 0.001 
Lottery 0.052 5,543 0.041 10,746 less than 0.001 
Local 0.089 3,684 0.013 9,340 less than 0.001 
Age 44.816 5,556 46.574 10,768 less than 0.001 
Daily Return 0.00028 5,548 0.00025 10,756 0.434 
Decile cutoff      
Overconfidence 0.085 2,447 0.088 1,700 0.750 
Disposition 0.039 1,798 0.039 1,215 0.972 
Clustering 0.302 2,445 0.278 1,701 0.002 
Gender 0.853 2,449 0.796 1,703 less than 0.001 
Lottery 0.049 2,444 0.049 1,700 0.981 
Local 0.017 929 0.006 977 0.027 
Age 44.138 2,449 45.068 1,703 0.009 
Daily Return 0.00024 2,447 0.00022 1,700 0.747 
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Table 5. Summary statistics on monthly portfolio returns, Sharpe ratios, and alphas for 
Islamic and Conventional Investors 
 
This table summarizes monthly unadjusted returns, Sharpe ratios, and one and four-factor alphas 
for Islamic and conventional investors. Islamic investors are identified by account at an Islamic 
brokerage house, holdings in component stocks of the Katilim index, or AKP vote share in city 
of residence. Conventional investors are those that are non-Islamic on all dimensions. T-
statistics are shown in parentheses. Number of observations is shown in square brackets. ‘***’, 
‘**’, and ‘*’ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. ‘a’ 
denotes the number in question is statistically significantly different from the number for 
conventional investors at the 1% level. 
 Islamic investors 
Conventional 
investors 
 
Brokerage 
house 
Katilim 
index 
AKP vote 
share  
Monthly raw 
return 
0.014*** 0.006**,a 0.012*** 0.012*** 
(13.828) (2.435) (20.948) (42.441) 
[665] [470] [5,513] [18,449] 
Sharpe ratio 0.035*** -0.036**,a 0.016*** 0.019*** 
(6.071) (-2.450) (5.353) (10.046) 
[665] [457] [5,469] [18,334] 
1-factor alpha 0.0003a 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
(0.429) (3.723) (10.953) (20.250) 
[665] [470] [5,513] [18,449] 
4-factor alpha -0.008***,a -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
(-9.914) (-7.129) (-18.574) (-30.791) 
[665] [470] [5,513] [18,449] 
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Table 6. Regressions to explain individual investor overconfidence 
 
This table presents regressions to explain individual estimated overconfidence with measures 
of piety and controls. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: Overconfidence 
 Brokerage house Katilim index AKP vote share 
Piety -0.036*** -0.047*** -0.008** 
 (-3.568) (-3.988) (-1.956) 
Age -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (-11.789) (-11.498) (-9.561) 
Gender 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 
 (10.088) (9.880) (7.367) 
Wealth (x10-6) -0.006* -0.006* -0.004 
 (-1.66) (-1.761) (-0.903) 
Stock Market Experience (x10-3) -0.156*** -0.159*** -0.150*** 
 (-16.074) (-16.332) (-12.231) 
City fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Number of observations 24,967 24,967 16,304 
R2 0.0305 0.0306 0.0215 
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Table 7. Regressions to explain individual investor lottery stock preference 
This table presents regressions to explain individual estimated lottery stock preference with 
measures of piety and controls. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: Lottery stock preference 
 Brokerage house Katilim index AKP vote share 
Piety -0.011* -0.021*** 0.009*** 
 (-1.918) (-2.989) (3.375) 
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-11.247) (-11.039) (-9.231) 
Gender 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
 (4.057) (3.928) (2.796) 
Wealth (x10-6) -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-1.082) (-1.124) (-0.507) 
Stock Market Experience (x10-3) -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.037*** 
 (-5.585) (-5.795) (-5.090) 
City fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Number of observations 24,946 24,946 16,289 
R2 0.0167 0.0169 0.0100 
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Table 8. Regressions to explain individual investor local bias 
This table presents regressions to explain individual estimated local bias with measures of piety 
and controls. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: Local bias 
 Brokerage house Katilim index AKP vote share 
All investors  
Piety 0.011 0.086*** 0.077*** 
 (1.130) (8.007) (21.356) 
Age 0.0003*** 0.0002** 0.0007*** 
 (2.751) (2.273) (4.971) 
Gender -0.004 -0.003 0.003 
 (-1.085) (-0.875) (0.653) 
Wealth (x10-6) 0.003 0.003 0.005 
 (0.948) (0.874) (1.509) 
Stock Market Experience (x10-3) -0.033*** -0.027*** -0.024** 
 (-3.623) (-2.982) (-2.359) 
City fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Number of observations 21,696 21,696 13,024 
R2 0.0887 0.0909 0.0358 
  
Excluding Istanbul  
Piety -0.0004 0.126*** 0.077*** 
 (-0.043) (12.339) (21.356) 
Age 0.0006*** 0.0004*** 0.0007*** 
 (4.451) (3.559) (4.971) 
Gender -0.002 -0.001 0.003 
 (-0.477) (-0.179) (0.653) 
Wealth (x10-6) 0.006** 0.006** 0.005 
 (1.993) (2.077) (1.509) 
Stock Market Experience (x10-3) -0.029*** -0.020** -0.024** 
 (-3.237) (-2.190) (-2.359) 
City fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Number of observations 13,024 13,024 13,024 
R2 0.1979 0.2079 0.0358 
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Table 9: Investor stereotypes produced by factor analysis 
This table summarizes factor analysis applied to the characteristics of the individual investors in our sample. Because of 
missing observations, sample size is 15,351 out of total possible 24,996 individual investors. The ‘‘varimax’’ method is used 
to produce ten factors but only the first four are reported given variance explained.  
 Investor classified as Islamic based on 
 Islamic brokerage account Holdings in Katilim Islamic AKP vote share in city of residence 
             
 Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 
Factor 
Characteristics:             
Eigenvalue 1.537 1.188 1.064 1.021 1.546 1.210 1.046 1.021 1.538 1.195 1.075 1.025 
Variance 
explained 
0.154 0.119 0.106 0.102 0.155 0.121 0.105 0.102 0.154 0.120 0.108 0.103 
            
Rotated Factor Loadings:            
Islamic brokerage 
account 
-0.082 -0.099 0.695 0.075         
Katilim_holdings     -0.101 -0.134 0.664 -0.080     
AKP vote share         -0.020 -0.017 0.701 0.222 
Age -0.072 0.718 -0.044 -0.183 -0.081 0.697 0.034 -0.190 -0.109 0.669 -0.123 -0.241 
Pre 2008 
experience 
-0.074 0.765 0.058 0.144 -0.108 0.734 -0.171 0.107 -0.112 0.749 -0.059 0.129 
Gender 0.117 0.029 0.379 0.562 0.091 0.057 -0.004 0.751 0.131 0.171 0.085 0.710 
Portfolio size 0.060 0.132 0.578 -0.209 0.126 0.291 0.656 0.314 0.089 0.324 0.203 0.013 
Clustering 0.648 0.080 0.165 0.190 0.636 0.101 -0.193 0.211 0.651 0.135 -0.003 0.213 
Disposition effect 0.710 -0.043 -0.063 -0.068 0.708 -0.059 -0.007 -0.095 0.707 -0.044 -0.028 -0.094 
Local bias -0.085 -0.196 0.247 -0.537 -0.067 -0.066 0.330 -0.133 -0.052 -0.006 0.717 -0.245 
Lottery stock 
preference 
-0.078 -0.243 -0.084 0.560 -0.124 -0.305 -0.154 0.523 -0.088 -0.255 -0.092 0.574 
Overconfidence 0.664 -0.174 -0.082 -0.014 0.657 -0.193 0.013 -0.019 0.663 -0.168 -0.008 -0.018 
Stereotype Impatient Experienced Pious Gambler Imp. Exp. Pious Gam. Imp. Exp. Pious Gam. 
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Table 10. Portfolio characteristics on individual investor characteristics 
This table presents errors-in-variables regressions where portfolio outcomes, both performance-
based and religious, are regressed on individual investor characteristics. Investor characteristics 
are standardized for ease of comparison between variables. We show regressions for reliability 
equal to 1 and 0.8, where reliability is defined as 1 −
𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
. Reliability equal to one 
corresponds to the case with no errors. At the bottom of the table, p-values from t-tests 
comparing coefficients on zAKP, zKONDA, and zPupils are shown. ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Dependent variable 
 Sharpe MUSIAD 
 Reliability Reliability 
 1 0.8 1 0.8 
zAge 0.005** 0.006** -0.004** -0.005** 
 (2.346) (2.544) (-1.985) (-2.379) 
zGender -0.000 0.002 0.013*** 0.011*** 
 (-0.042) (0.772) (6.740) (5.467) 
zExperience 0.017*** 0.014*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (8.468) (6.929) (-9.819) (-9.756) 
zWealth 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (1.589) (1.049) (0.888) (1.111) 
zAKP 0.007* 0.124 0.000 -0.102 
 (1.751) (1.625) (0.058) (-1.407) 
zKONDA -0.004 -0.096 -0.005* 0.070 
 (-1.158) (-1.613) (-1.683) (1.240) 
zPupils -0.003 -0.057 0.024*** 0.077** 
 (-1.253) (-1.617) (9.834) (2.302) 
zOverconfidence -0.078*** -0.099*** 0.001 0.001 
 (-41.937) (-41.124) (0.398) (0.280) 
zDisposition -0.045*** -0.054*** 0.000 0.001 
 (-21.449) (-20.129) (0.168) (0.289) 
zClustering 0.032*** 0.046*** -0.001 -0.000 
 (14.019) (15.061) (-0.643) (-0.012) 
zLottery -0.006*** -0.007** 0.002 0.002 
 (-2.641) (-2.502) (1.194) (1.007) 
zLocal -0.004* -0.007** 0.006** 0.009*** 
 (-1.733) (-2.200) (2.796) (3.134) 
Observations 15,219 15,219 15,295 15,295 
R2 0.1629 0.2028 0.0211 0.0265 
     
p-value (zAKP = zKONDA) 0.112 0.105 0.371 0.182 
p-value (zAKP = zPupils) 0.082 0.104 0.000 0.091 
p-value (zKONDA = zPupils) 0.839 0.115 0.000 0.784 
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Table 11. Median characteristics of Islamic and secular firms identified by managerial 
membership of secular and religious executive clubs 
This table presents medians of corporate characteristics across firms categorized by social 
connections of its CEO.  The Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) 
is traditionally aligned with secular thought and politicians while the Independent Industrialists’ 
and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD) is associated with conservative views and the AKP. 
An annual list of TUSIAD members is publicly available. MUSIAD does not publish a list of 
members so we collect mention of MUSIAD membership from the internet but are left with a 
third category of firms which are not TUSIAD but cannot be explicitly associated with 
MUSIAD. Leverage is debt as a fraction of assets. The number of observations (firm-quarters 
except firm-months for monthly raw return and firms for alpha) is given in brackets. A non-
parametric equality of medians test is conducted for each corporate measure. 
   
 p-value for test of  
equality of medians 
 
Secular 
(TUSIAD) 
firm-quarters 
Conservative 
(MUSIAD) 
firm-quarters 
 
 
Other 
firm-
quarters 
Secular 
versus 
Conservative 
firm-quarters 
 
Secular 
versus 
Other firm-
quarters 
Total assets 1002.05 779.44 164.42 0.087 0.000 
 [1,914] [778] [4,090]   
Sales 481.97 705.91 150.41 0.000 0.000 
 [1,715] [660] [3,560]   
Market capitalization 387.1 405.44 103.17 0.459 0.000 
 [1,820] [759] [3,969]   
Return on assets 2.749 2.376 2.372 0.112 0.034 
 [1,812] [657] [3,698]   
Return on equity 10.638 8.068 5.928 0.018 0.000 
 [1,769] [639] [3,541]   
Asset growth 11.198 15.22 8.281 0.000 0.000 
 [1,837] [677] [3,770]   
Leverage 0.542 0.553 0.424 0.493 0.000 
 [1,914] [778] [4,089]   
Tobin's q 1.016 1.042 1.103 0.017 0.000 
 [1,820] [759] [3,969]   
Price-earnings ratio 10.351 12.529 11.663 0.014 0.001 
 [1,470] [536] [2,735]   
Monthly raw return 0.008 0.005 0.000 0.384 0.000 
 [7,075] [2,465] [13,525]   
1-factor alpha 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.430 0.586 
 [135] [57] [316]   
4-factor alpha -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 0.430 0.047 
 [135] [57] [316]   
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Table 12. Median characteristics of conservative and secular firms identified by 
sponsorship activities 
This table presents medians of corporate characteristics across firms categorized by the type of 
activities they sponsor. Sponsorship activities are labeled either secular or conservative. 
Conservative sponsorships are either linked to the conservative AKP government or are 
religious in nature. A firm that sponsors a single conservative activity during our sample period 
is identified as conservative. Leverage is debt as a fraction of assets. The number of observations 
(firms) is given in brackets. A non-parametric equality of medians test is conducted for each 
corporate measure. 
    
p-value for test of  
equality of medians  
 
 
Conservative 
firms 
Secular 
firms 
Firms without 
conservative 
sponsorship 
Conservative 
versus 
Secular firms 
Conservative 
versus non-
conservative firms 
Total assets 366.59 521.71 190.11 0.691 0.021 
 [30] [160] [331]   
Sales 391.65 388.30 155.80 0.974 0.111 
 [28] [151] [309]   
Market 
capitalization 290.39 331.95 119.14 0.425 0.007 
 [30] [154] [321]   
Return on assets 1.790 2.834 2.385 0.294 0.835 
 [25] [150] [289]   
Return on equity 12.813 8.677 6.156 0.516 0.532 
 [25] [147] [285]   
Asset growth 14.813 10.486 8.894 0.052 0.059 
 [25] [151] [292]   
Leverage 0.455 0.492 0.444 0.691 0.987 
 [30] [160] [331]   
Tobin's q 1.055 1.030 1.090 0.110 0.259 
 [30] [154] [321]   
Price-earnings 
ratio 12.257 10.792 12.886 0.521 0.846 
 [29] [148] [297]   
Monthly raw 
return 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.854 0.848 
 [35] [183] [376]   
1-factor alpha 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.854 0.849 
 [35] [189] [392]   
4-factor alpha -0.010 -0.004 -0.006 0.098 0.386 
 [35] [189] [392]   
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Table 13. Examining religious portfolio holdings around influential events 
This table provides difference-in-differences analysis of religious portfolio holdings around 
influential events. The event in specification (1) is the Gaza flotilla raid that took place on 31 
May 2010. In specification (2), the event is the change in government in Tunisia and the 
outbreak of protests in Egypt in January 2011 as part of Arab Spring uprisings. We look at a 
one-year window before and after the month in question. After Event is one (zero) for the twelve 
months following (preceding) the event month. ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 Dependent variable 
 MUSIAD Percentage Holdings 
 (1) (2) 
After Event 0.065 0.072 
 (1.518) (1.618) 
KONDA -0.049*** -0.046*** 
 (-3.854) (-3.490) 
AKP 0.000* 0.000 
 (-1.949) (-0.009) 
Pupils 0.009*** 0.008*** 
 (28.244) (23.676) 
After Event * KONDA -0.029 -0.029 
 (-1.606) (-1.513) 
After Event * AKP 0.001*** 0.001** 
 (3.769) (2.178) 
After Event * Pupils -0.002*** -0.001** 
 (-3.832) (-2.201) 
Age -0.001*** 0.000*** 
 (-11.701) (-9.434) 
Gender 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 (24.302) (23.147) 
Experience 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (-27.753) (-25.158) 
Wealth 0.000 0.000 
 (0.449) (1.002) 
Overconfidence 0.025*** 0.010*** 
 (10.542) (4.224) 
Lottery 0.034 0.050 
 (0.034) (0.050) 
Local 0.028*** 0.032*** 
 (11.710) (12.554) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
Observations 308,626 299,726 
R2 0.0150 0.0124 
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Appendix A: The Katilim 50 Index 
The Katilim (“Participation”) 50 Index is is an index of 50 publicly listed Turkish firms that are 
deemed sharia compliant. The governing board consists of representatives from the four 
members of the “Association of Participation Banks”, Bizim Securities Inc. (this is the 
brokerage firm whose customers we characterize as Islamic), and Turkey’s four Islamic banks. 
Bizim partners with four Islamic banks exclusively (http://www.bmd.com.tr/) and is the single 
Turkish brokerage considered Islamic. The index excludes certain industries regarded non-
compliant such as financials (they involve interest income), alcohol, gambling, pork-based food, 
media, advertising, tourism, tobacco, defense, and futures (gold, silver, and currency trades). 
Index components must have limited interest-bearing liabilities (for example, interest bearing 
loans cannot exceed 30% of market capitalization), interest-bearing assets, and interest income. 
The index is composed of 50 largest firms by market cap that meet these criteria. Hence, index 
components are typically well known firms. The index is updated quarterly and changes are 
announced at http://www.katilimendeksi.org. 
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Appendix B: Description of behavioral bias proxies and other investor 
characteristics 
 
Variable Description References Calculation 
Disposition Effect Investor’s propensity 
to sell winners too 
early and hold losers 
too long. Measured 
by the proportion of 
gains realized minus 
proportion of losses 
realized. 
Shefrin and 
Statman (1985), 
Odean (1998), and 
Kumar and Lim 
(2008). 
Proportion of gains 
realized (PGR) = 
realized 
gains/(realized 
gains+paper gains). 
Proportion of losses 
realized (PLR) = 
realized 
losses/(realized 
losses+paper losses). 
Narrow Framing Investor’s propensity 
to select investments 
individually instead 
of considering the 
broad impact on her 
portfolio. 
Kahneman and 
Lovallo (1993), 
Kahneman (2003), 
and Kumar and 
Lim (2008). 
Trade clustering = 1 
– (number of trading 
days/number of 
trades). It is 
inversely related to 
narrow framing. 
Overconfidence Investor’s propensity 
to trade frequently 
but unsuccessfully. 
Measured with a 
dummy variable. 
Barber and Odean 
(2001), and Bailey, 
Kumar, and Ng 
(2011). 
Dummy variable 
equal to one for 
investors in the 
highest portfolio 
turnover quintile and 
lowest performance 
quintile for their 
individual common 
stock trading and 
zero otherwise. 
Local Bias Investor’s propensity 
to select stocks with 
headquarters in their 
city of residence. 
Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999), 
Bailey, Kumar, and 
Ng (2011). 
Difference in ratios 
between the share of 
local firms in an 
investor’s holdings 
and the share of 
Borsa Istanbul firms 
that are local to the 
investor. 
Lottery Stock 
Preference 
Investor’s propensity 
to select stocks with 
lottery-like features 
(low price, volatile 
returns, and skewed 
returns). 
Kumar (2009). Investor’s portfolio 
weight (relative to 
the weight in the 
market portfolio) 
assigned to stocks 
that have bottom 
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quintile prices, top 
quintile idiosyncratic 
volatility, and top 
quintile idiosyncratic 
skewness. 
Pious City Dummy 
(AKP) 
Indicates piety of 
city as proxied by 
AKP vote share in 
2011 general 
elections. 
New in this paper. Dummy variable 
equal to one for 
investors from cities 
that have higher 
votes for AKP than 
the median-vote city, 
Istanbul. Zero for 
investors from cities 
with below Istanbul 
AKP votes. 
Undefined for 
investors from 
Istanbul. 
Pious City Measure 
(KONDA) 
Indicates piety of 
city as measured by 
religiosity score 
from KONDA 
survey between 2010 
and 2012. 
New in this paper. Average monthly 
score, which can 
range from 1 (non-
believer) to 4 
(devout), for each 
city between 2010 
and 2012. 
Pious City Measure 
(Pupils) 
Indicates piety of 
city as proxied by 
the number of 
Quranic school 
pupils in that city. 
New in this paper. The number of 
Quranic school 
pupils in a given city 
per thousand people. 
Gender Investor’s gender Self-reported. Dummy variable 
equal to one if the 
investor is male. 
Age Age of the investor. Self-reported. Age of the investor. 
Wealth Proxy for the wealth 
of investor. 
Based on 
investment record. 
Investor’s median 
total asset value 
through sampling 
period. 
Stock Market 
Experience 
Proxy for investment 
experience of 
investor. 
Based on 
investment record. 
The number of days 
the investor had a 
brokerage account 
until 2008, the 
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beginning of our 
sample period. 
Daily Performance Raw daily return of 
investor’s portfolio. 
Based on 
investment record. 
Raw mean daily 
value-weighted 
return of investor’s 
portfolio. 
Monthly Raw 
Performance 
Raw monthly return 
of investor’s 
portfolio. 
Based on 
investment record. 
Raw mean monthly 
value-weighted 
return of investor’s 
portfolio. 
Stock Portfolio 
Alpha 
Risk-adjusted excess 
return of investor’s 
stock portfolio. 
Based on 
investment record. 
The intercept, alpha, 
from FF-4 Factor 
regression with the 
monthly common 
stock portfolio return 
as dependent 
variable. 
Stock Portfolio 
Market Factor (Beta) 
Exposure 
The beta of the 
investor’s stock 
portfolio. 
Based on 
investment record. 
The loading of the 
stock portfolio on the 
market factor in a 
four-factor 
regression model 
with size, value, and 
momentum factors. 
Factors are local and 
constructed from 
scratch. 
Stock Portfolio SMB 
Factor (Size) 
Exposure 
The loading of the 
stock portfolio on the 
small-minus-big 
factor (SMB) in a 
four-factor model 
regression. 
Based on 
investment record. 
The loading of the 
stock portfolio on the 
size (SMB) factor in 
a four-factor 
regression model. 
Stock Portfolio HML 
Factor (Value) 
Exposure 
The loading of the 
stock portfolio on the 
high-minus-low 
book-to-market 
factor (HML) in a 
four-factor model 
regression. 
Based on 
investment record. 
The loading of the 
stock portfolio on the 
value (HML) factor 
in a four-factor 
regression model. 
Stock Portfolio 
WML Factor 
(Momentum) 
Exposure 
The loading of the 
stock portfolio on the 
winners-minus-
losers factor (WML) 
Based on 
investment record. 
The loading of the 
stock portfolio on the 
momentum (WML) 
factor in a four-
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in a four-factor 
model regression. 
factor regression 
model. 
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Figure 1:  Recent voting patterns in Turkey 
 
The map summarizes the results of the general election of 12th June 2011. See 
http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/t/turkey/turkey-legislative-
election-2011.html . 
 
 
 
